United States Foreign Assistance Programs: the Requirement of Metrics for Security Assistance and Security Cooperation Programs by Carl, Stephen J.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2012-06
United States Foreign Assistance Programs: the
Requirement of Metrics for Security Assistance and
Security Cooperation Programs
Carl, Stephen J.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
UNITED STATES FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS: 
THE REQUIREMENT OF METRICS FOR SECURITY 









 Thesis Co-advisors: Donald Abenheim 
  Carolyn Halladay 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
June 2012 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  United States Foreign Assistance Programs: The 
Requirement of Metrics for Security Assistance and Security Cooperation Programs 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Stephen J. Carl Jr. 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.  IRB Protocol number ______N/A______.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
Foreign aid has been a signal component of United States foreign policy since the creation of the Marshall Plan. Since 
that time, as new requirements emerged, numerous foreign aid programs and initiatives were created and 
subsequently piecemealed together under various U.S. agencies.  The confluence of programs, initiatives, and 
agencies has created a confusing and overly bureaucratized environment for expending funds in an effort to support 
the democratization and modernization of other countries.  This study examines U.S. aid provided to Ukraine and 
Georgia to determine if they have progressed toward Westernized defense and military structures, in accordance with 
their stated national goals, within the realm of logistics. 
      The question is whether U.S. security aid in these states has helped to achieve these goals.  Addressing this 
question, this thesis proposes a hierarchal construct with differing assessment criteria based on how and where U.S. 
aid is applied.  In the end, this analysis shows that U.S. aid and assistance programs and funds have assisted both 
Ukraine and Georgia with their modernization efforts.  However, U.S. policy makers and policy implementers need to 
consideration alternative and new methods to accurately assess how well those funds are spent in-line with U.S. 




15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
132 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Security Cooperation, Security Assistance, Foreign Assistance, Foreign Aid, 
Logistics, Ukraine, Georgia, Partnership for Peace (PfP) 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
UNITED STATES FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS: 
THE REQUIREMENT OF METRICS FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND 
SECURITY COOPERATION PROGRAMS 
 
 
Stephen J Carl Jr. 
Major, United States Marine Corps 
B.S. Mathematics, The Ohio State University, 1999 
M.S. Accounting and Financial Management, University of Maryland, 2009 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 

























Chair, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
Foreign aid has been a signal component of United States foreign policy since the 
creation of the Marshall Plan. Since that time, as new requirements emerged, numerous 
foreign aid programs and initiatives were created and subsequently piecemealed together 
under various U.S. agencies.  The confluence of programs, initiatives, and agencies has 
created a confusing and overly bureaucratized environment for expending funds in an 
effort to support the democratization and modernization of other countries.  This study 
examines U.S. aid provided to Ukraine and Georgia to determine if they have progressed 
toward Westernized defense and military structures, in accordance with their stated 
national goals, within the realm of logistics. 
The question is whether U.S. security aid in these states has helped to achieve 
these goals.  Addressing this question, this thesis proposes a hierarchal construct with 
differing assessment criteria based on how and where U.S. aid is applied.  In the end, this 
analysis shows that U.S. aid and assistance programs and funds have assisted both 
Ukraine and Georgia with their modernization efforts.  However, U.S. policy makers and 
policy implementers need to consideration alternative and new methods to accurately 
assess how well those funds are spent in-line with U.S. foreign policy goals. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The following experience had by this writer in the midst of research for this thesis 
speaks to its core question of the quantitative measure of the value of security assistance.  
At a recent logistics modernization conference for the Ukrainian Rear Services held in 
February 2012, a certain Ukrainian officer, a major of the Military Cooperation and 
International Operations of the Army Command, stood out among the attendees.1  He 
was a recent military graduate of the United States Marine Corps Command and Staff 
College and he was now attending this conference.  He was an International Military 
Education and Training (IMET) recipient who had also attended language training prior 
to attending the Professional Military Education schooling in Quantico, Virginia.  The 
fact that he successfully completed the language training and the Command and Staff 
College course is one indicator to critics that the IMET programs have worth beyond the 
dollars spent in aid of allies and partners.   
However, there is more to the cost benefit analysis than the officer’s U.S. 
certifications.  The value he provided at the logistics conference came not only through 
his ability to provide translation skills, but also in the greater depth of understanding of 
issues of policy and programs than those translation efforts between the U.S. and 
Ukrainian delegations. Overall, his contribution allowed for a greater understanding of 
complex problems of security and defense among the Ukrainian delegation, which 
ultimately will reduce future costs for additional retraining of the subject matter, which 
would arise if the delegation did not fully understand these questions during this visit. 
Thus, there is no question that the investment of U.S. time and education in this 
officer has a positive effect now and in the future.  But how can this longer-term effect be 
                                                 
1 During the writing of this thesis, the author had the opportunity to travel to Kyiv for research—in the 
former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, fostered by the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. I realized that 
time and events changed not only a political ideology and a country but its people as well, and by 
extension, their military too.  I attended a logistics modernization conference for the Ukrainian Rear 
Services and even provided a briefing on Marine Corps Aviation Logistics at their Officer’s Club in 
downtown Kyiv—an event that, twenty-five years earlier, I would have never thought possible.  The 
Ukrainian military attendees were very friendly and open about the challenges they faced as they have 
gradually progressed from the legacy of a communist system to a more liberal democracy that takes into 
account the hard realities of the immense costs of building and sustaining a viable military force. 
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articulated, particularly to an audit and accountability community which oversees such 
programs often without direct experience of such efforts other than in a general sense and 
that prefers quantifiable results that accord with practices of management and public 
finance?  The value that the Ukrainian officer added to the conference cannot be 
measured “objectively,” through common metrics as might apply in some conventional 
defense program or weapon procurement; rather it is subjective in nature as it provides 
verification of skills within the Ukrainian military hierarchy.  The Ukrainian major 
provides a perhaps overly simplistic but real-life example of the fundamental issue that 
plagues policy makers and those charged with identifying the successful application of 
foreign aid and security cooperation funds—how to measure the success of foreign aid in 
the public and national interest. 
Indeed, since the inception of the Marshall Plan in 1947 and the Mutual 
Assistance Program (aid of arms and technical assistance to European forces) in 1949–
1950, the United States has spent more than $587 billion (inflation adjusted calculated 
through fiscal year 2009) in foreign assistance2 with the preponderance of aid, almost 
$310 billion, provided just since North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) program was instituted less than two decades ago.3  While 
$38.5 billion4 has specifically been allocated for PfP member countries, this trend 
indicates the growing political nature of providing ever-increasing aid that is specifically 
intended for promoting democratic ideals. 
However, as a result of the Sept 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, a rapid increase in 
foreign  assistance funds were allocated through Department of State (DOS) and 
                                                 
2 United States Agency for International Development, “Detailed Foreign Assistance Data,” accessed 
November 8, 2011, http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/data/detailed.html. 
3 The Partnership for Peace program is, in its essence, a mechanism by which non-NATO members 
can interact and coordinate with NATO.  It grew out of the breakup of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw 
Pact, as well as the dissolution of Yugoslavia, as the established western democracies cast about for ways 
to engage and integrate democratizing Europe, but it also accommodates Europe's armed neutrals and states 
that, for various reasons, do not aspire to full NATO membership.   
4 United States Agency for International Development, “Detailed Foreign Assistance Data.” 
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Department of Defense (DoD), by 264 percent,5 which focused primarily on transnational 
terrorism detection and prevention, and indicated a minor shift away from, albeit 
temporarily, democratic promotion to bolstering security.  These funds have been 
provided to recipient nations under two primary Foreign Assistance programs, the DoD’s 
Security Cooperation program6 and the DOS’s Security Assistance program,7 with the 
goal of promoting U.S. policies and interests8 as well as enabling these nation states to 
flourish in international organizations as well as share the burden of defense.9  Two-odd 
decades later, experts and practitioners rightly ask whether the results are repaying the 
effort. 
Taking up this question, this study examines the instances of Ukraine and 
Georgia—both former Soviet nation states that have accepted the membership conditions 
                                                 
5 The 264% increase was calculated based on the USAID FY01 world total of $12.85 billion and the 
FY09 world total of $33.95 billion.  It should also be noted that between FY01-09, over 21% ($48.3 
billion) of total world foreign assistance ($226 billion) was allocated specifically for Iraq and Afghanistan.  
United States Agency for International Development, “Detailed Foreign Assistance Data.” 
6 Security Cooperation is the Department of Defense’s group of programs, authorized by Congress 
beginning in 2006 under Title 10 funding, which provides for military training, military exercises, and 
fosters military-to-military interoperability to support COCOM theater strategies.  Primary Security 
Cooperation programs are WIF, Build Capacity of Foreign Military Forces (Section 1206), Cooperative 
Threat Reduction (CTR), COCOM Initiative Fund (CCIF), and Developing Country Combined Exercise 
Program (DCCEP).  United States Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense 
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 296. 
7 Security Assistance is the Department of State’s group of programs, authorized by the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 under Title 22 funding, which provide military hardware, education, and defense-
related services to further U.S. national policies and interests.  Top Security Assistance programs are 
Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), International Military Education and 
Training (IMET), and Peace-Keeping Operations (PKO).  United States Department of Defense, Joint 
Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 2010), 296. 
8 For the purposes of this thesis, national security interests and policies are specific objectives 
indicated by the Legislative or Executive Branch which promote cooperation with foreign countries with 
the strategic goal of protecting U.S. citizens and economic interests.  This can be achieved directly by 
providing assistance to specific security programs or indirectly by creating stable countries that, in turn, 
create stable regions.  It should be noted that the specific objectives and interests can be politically 
motivated and are subject to wide variability from year-to-year. 
9 For the purposes of this research, there are 13 major security assistance and security cooperation 
programs under the three agencies/departments that are considered: USAID – DoD Assistance; DOS – 
FMS, FMF, IMET, SEED/FSA/AEECA, and NADR; DoD – Section 1206, Section 1207, WIF, Coalition 
Readiness Support Program, and the Civic Engagement’s three humanitarian programs. 
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of the NATO PfP10 program without an associated Membership Action Plan (MAP),11 
but that both have special NATO commissions established for providing even further 
dialogue and consultation on security issues—to determine if they have progressed 
toward a modernized and integrated security defense and military structure with the 
financial assistance provided from the U.S. government under the various Title 10 DoD 
and Title 22 DOS funding programs.12  In this connection, this thesis explores how and 
how well defense institution building functions, especially in its dimension of 
programmatic and budgetary oversight in the cases of Ukraine and Georgia.  These two 
nations combined have received almost $5.2 billion through all aid programs between 
1996 and 2009, though the types and amounts of aid provided to each country have 
                                                 
10 The Partnership for Peace (PfP) program was major initiative proposed at the January 1994 
Brussels Summit Meeting of the North Atlantic Council.  The initial aim of the program was to “enhance 
stability and security throughout Europe.”  North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook, 
(Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), 69. 
The PfP program has undoubtedly been successful in its application as it has allowed for member 
countries to work with NATO on their individual terms and not through a parochial set of goals.  
Additionally, PfP has enabled, though not all inclusive) greater interoperability, regional cooperation, 
opportunities for exercises and training, as well as the ability to enhance future operations through the 
experiences of others (lessons learned).  David Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in 
International Security, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 98. 
11 The Membership Action Plan (MAP), launched in 1999, is a grouping of programs designed to 
facilitate aspirant countries’ focused movement toward NATO with a desire for eventual membership.  The 
MAP programs cover five areas: political and economic issues, defense and military issues, resources, 
security, and legal issues.  NATO does make it clear that all five areas should not be considered a checklist 
for NATO accession and any offers of accession remain wholly at the geopolitical level.   North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook, 65-67. 
12 The primary DoD and DOS foreign aid and assistance program considered in this paper are: DoD: 
Section 1206, Section 1207, Civic Engagement (includes Humanitarian Assistance-Other, Humanitarian 
and Civic Assistance, and Humanitarian Assistance Program Excess Property), Coalition Readiness 
Support Program (CRSP), and the Warsaw Initiative Fund (WIF); DOS: IMET, Foreign Military Financing 
(FMF), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA), and the 
Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related programs (NADR).  The AEECA funding 
account, established in 2009, combines two formerly separate accounts into one. The two accounts were: 
the Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States (commonly known as the Support for East 
European Democracy or SEED, established in 1989) and the Assistance for the Independent States of the 
former Soviet Union (commonly known as the FREEDOM Support Act (FSA) established in 1992).  
United States Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Foreign Aid Reform: Agency 
Coordination by Marian Leonardo Lawson and Susan B. Epstein, CRS Report R40756, (Washington, DC: 
Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, August 7, 2009), 13. 
These five DOS programs do not constitute the totality of Program Areas provided under the Peace and 
Security DOS objective, nor does it include all of the accounts supported under the Peace and Security 
objective.  This will be explained in greater detail with the Foreign Assistance Framework sheet. 
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varied widely.13  Ukraine and Georgia have been selected case studies based on their 
strategic as well as energy-security relevance to the European Union (EU) and ultimately 
to NATO countries, as well as the United States.  Ensuring continued energy commerce 
to the EU will require stable and growing economies within each country.  The question, 
then, is whether U.S. security aid in these states is helping achieve these goals. 
A. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis comprises five chapters.  Chapter I introduces the assessment pyramid 
which will be the basis for discuss through this paper as well as examining some of the 
issues that currently plague U.S. security assistance and security cooperation programs.  
Chapter II will provide a background of the U.S. foreign aid, which establishes the 
foundation for why U.S. aid and assistance continues to be given throughout the world 
today.  This chapter will also present the DOS security assistance program and the DoD 
security cooperation program along a section on the background of the PfP.  Chapters III 
and IV undertake a comprehensive examination of Ukraine and Georgia, respectively.  
While the modernization experiences of both countries diverge on some key points, their 
combined story shows that U.S. aspirations of security assistance and security 
cooperation have not yet been fully realized.  Preceding each chapter’s detailed reform 
sections is a review of foreign aid along with a background of the significant political 
evolutions from Communism to acceptance in the NATO PfP structure. 
Chapter V provides the conclusion and offers recommendations for policy 
makers, and those charged with the implementation of providing aid, to create a 
successful aid story that: funding provided equals U.S. foreign policy goals but without 
being restricted under a hard metric paradigm.  In the end, this analysis shows that U.S. 
aid and assistance programs and funds have assisted both Ukraine and Georgia with their 
modernization efforts.  However, U.S. policy makers and policy implementers need to 
consideration alternative and new methods to accurately assess how well those funds are 
spent in-line with U.S. foreign policy goals. 
                                                 
13 Since acceptance in the PfP program, and through FY09, the amount of aid distributed has 
surpassed $5.2 billion – broken out as: Georgia has exceeded $2.3 billion and Ukraine has exceeded $2.9 
billion.  United States Agency for International Development, “Detailed Foreign Assistance Data.” 
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B. THE QUEST FOR METRICS 
The January 1994 creation of NATO’s PfP program opened a new venue for new 
democracies of Central and Eastern Europe to develop yet closer ties with NATO and its 
member nations from the advent of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in November 
1991. (While initial funding for the PfP program came from the United States under 
PfP’s Warsaw Initiative Fund [WIF], the DoD and DOS have provided additional funds 
on an annual basis under programs and initiatives that predate PfP from the origins of 
security assistance in the Cold War and the creation of NATO in 1949–50.)  For those 
central European states that departed from the collapsed Warsaw Pact and opted to seek 
out PfP and eventually NATO membership, after 1995, the closer relationship also came 
with security assistance and often funding from the United States and other allies for 
efforts at democratization,14 westernization,15 security sector reform, and the 
modernization16 of defense and military organizations to what the central European saw 
as a “western standard.”   In reality, of course, such a “western standard” was partially an 
illusion, since the allies had poorly conceived of a process to enable new allies to join the 
alliance.  This western standard, however, took on a life of its own in the second half of 
the 1990s, as these processes of enlargement consolidated in a give and take among 
central Europeans and the NATO allies, especially the United States.  Of considerable 
importance in this process, of course, was the question of the costs and benefits of such 
                                                 
14 For the purposes of this thesis, democratization is defined here as the process of a country 
transforming their previous regime to a multi-party political system which embraces open and fair 
elections.  Despite the various types of democracies and levels of democratic rule, democratization in this 
paper indicates the movement away from the Soviet system of total rule.  Guillermo O'Donnell, and 
Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain 
Democracies, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 8. 
15 For the purposes of this thesis, westernization refers to the gradual process of a country that 
assimilates the values associated with Western Europe and the United States into their own culture and 
ethos.  These non-inclusive values would include open and honest journalism, minimal corruption in law 
and government offices, and a strong legal system that advocates for the people.  Samuel P. Huntington, 
The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 57. 
16 For the purposes of this thesis, modernization is the process by which a country expands or 
improves policy-determined capabilities through the purchase of new equipment, creation and institution of 
new policies, and/or the restructuring of personnel and organizations with the intent to have an analogous 
end-state which is compatible with NATO and leading NATO member countries’ armed forces.  
Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 68. 
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an effort, especially to those in the legislative and executive branch of the U.S. 
government.  
In the ensuing decade and a half, however, neither academic scholarship nor 
government oversight have completely analyzed the need for PfP member states to 
modernize, in order to provide for territorial integrity along with NATO interoperability, 
with clear U.S. funding initiatives that are in concert with U.S. foreign policy goals.  
Although mandated through Congressional statutes, to date, specific metrics, standards, 
and measurements of success have only been subjective in nature at the DOS foreign 
policy level with more objective evaluative measurements at the tactical level.  This 
circumstance has led to the advent of an event-based success model as opposed to an 
outcome-based model that takes into account actual modernization improvements within 
recipient countries.  (In other words, service providers report the number of certificates 
that the Ukrainian officer in the introduction collected, as well as the number of U.S. 
sponsored events he attends, but neither the statutes nor the standard accounting 
conventions capture the broader effects of all this activity.)  
Objective assessments by means of modern management techniques of how well 
these funds have been spent to the ends of policy and strategy and whether they have 
resulted in benefits for the target country, the United States, and NATO have proven 
elusive because of the lack of generalized understanding—either in the target country or 
in the U.S. government—of the character, evolution, dynamics and even short falls of 
defense reform.  None can agree with any fluency on the political and programmatic 
point of departure in defense and security structures of partner nations who recently have 
become allies.  Figures in the U.S. Congress, the U.S. State Department, the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, as well as think tanks with an interest in this issue, continue to 
press for an agreed basis of such security, defense and military reform as well as metrics 
and measures of effectiveness for invested dollars, which poses an acute challenge for 
Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) who have for decades been the masters, more or 
less, of such programs in practice.   
In particular, in the recent past and the present as the center of gravity of U.S. 
defense has shifted to other theaters and the budget rigors have taken hold in the financial 
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crisis, the European Command (EUCOM) Commander, where the predecessors of PfP 
began some around twenty years ago under the aegis of the late General George 
Shalikashvili, must respond to such imperatives of policy scrutiny, particularly because 
the command enjoys the preponderance of WIF dollars granted by the Congress and the 
Secretary of Defense. Although the EUCOM Plans Directorate (J-5), responsible for the 
implementation and tracking of WIF and other DoD funding initiatives within the 
European Area of Responsibility (AOR), has created its own table of metrics, these 
numbers are based more on the quantitative actualization of completed calendar events in 
support of wider security assistance and cooperation initiatives.  Plainly stated, 
EUCOM’s metrics track dollars-to-events rather than dollars-to-outputs in policy and 
programs, even though this latter qualitative measurement has been the goal of the 
Congressional committees that oversee the funds and their results.   
Part of the problem arises in the very quest for simple, quantitative measures amid 
defense management practices, whereas in reality, state building and the consolidation of 
security and armed forces in political flux embodies a diffuse process with imponderables 
that are poorly apprehended by routines of program analysis and evaluation on the model 
of Programming, Planning and Budgeting, which Robert S. McNamara introduced a half 
century ago into the U.S. Department of Defense.  Although U.S. constitutional desires 
dictate the judicious use of the tax payer’s treasure, as well as commercial experience, 
suggest that “good metric results equal funding spent well,” the reality is actually more 
troubling, though familiar not only in the defense sector but in many forms of public 
policy.  In practice, the budgetary and bureaucratic motto runs more like: “Money not 
spent this year will mean less money next year,” and “It doesn’t matter if this program or 
weapon makes any sense, we have to buy (or spend on) it.”  The interconnection between 
these two mantras becomes problematic as government fiscal officers and those in charge 
of executing those funds must attempt to evaluate the end–state of the “bang for the 
buck.”  As a result, Congressional policymakers have tended to require the DoD and 
DOS to provide metrics in order to demonstrate that such treasure has not been wasted in 
the normal process of checks and balances connected with the power of the purse and 
arms in the state.  
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This imperative of policy ensures actual value for taxpayer dollars spent, in 
contrast to the Soviet system especially in its late phase of the 1980s, where the lack of 
parliamentary and civil society oversight and checks and balances bankrupted the Soviet 
Union and Warsaw Pact in a way that was painfully apparent to those at hand in the 
1990s in central Europe.  It also speaks to the Taylorite17 “metrics culture” of defense 
management that is rampant throughout the federal government and especially within the 
DoD since the reign of Robert McNamara, but well before in the twentieth century with 
the bond between Wall Street and new forms of defense management in the era of total 
war that began in 1917 and reached its high point of managerial optimism in the 1960s.  
However, in the year 1990, almost no one in the U.S. government had a clear idea of how 
modernization and democratization of defense institutions in countries of the former 
Eastern bloc would operate in practice and how such a process would be joined with the 
routine of defense management.  Rather, the central and eastern Europeans, who emerged 
from the rubble of the Warsaw Pact, set the agenda with their desire for partnership and 
full status as allies.  The regulatory structure was even less well developed.  The start of 
the collapse of the eastern bloc came as a huge surprise in the fall of 1989, and the 
response of policy in the U.S. and the leading NATO allies as well as the alliance 
leadership itself was an improvisation that evolved into a series of programs, in which the 
western defense bureaucracies employed certain existing entities as well as new ones 
(security assistance being an old one and PfP being a new one) to the needs of Poles 
Czechs, Hungarians, and Slovaks in the first years of enlargement.  For instance, no 
regulation on the democratization of a former Soviet general staff or defense ministry 
                                                 
17 The term Taylorite is derived from Frederick Winslow Taylor’s 1911 book “The Principles of 
Scientific Management.”  Taylor proffered that the most scientific man will certainly rise to the top much 
more rapidly than those who are not.  He promoted his theory by illustrating the inefficiencies of the 
everyday citizen in the United States as they conducted their daily business.  And in order to thwart these 
inefficiencies, scientific management must be applied.  He believed that detailed planning and metrics of 
the scientific method could be applied to all aspects of human activity.  Frederick Winslow Taylor, The 
Principles of Scientific Management, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1911), 6-7. 
Contrary to Taylor, Henry Mintzberg, in his book “Mintzberg on Management,” argues that “an 
obsession with efficiency can force the trading off of social benefits for economic ones that can drive an 
organization beyond economic morality to a social immorality.”  Mintzberg offers that “efficiency is 
associated with a particular system of values” where “efficiency emerges as one pillar of an ideology that 
worships economic goals, sometimes with immoral consequences.”  Henry Mintzberg, Mintzberg on 
Management: Inside Our Strange World of Organizations, (New York: Free Press, 1989), 334. 
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existed in DoD praxis in 1994, a fact that underscores plainly that certain programs 
within the security assistance and security cooperation sectors do not lend themselves to 
any meaningful quantification of outcomes in policy and strategy. 
A prime example would the DOS’s IMET program, which provides funds to 
recipient countries to educate their military and defense civilians at U.S. schools and 
academies, as well as funding mobile training and education teams to respond to the 
needs of the host country.  The collapse of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 added enormous 
policy importance to IMET in the early 1990s.  Although IMET reaches back half a 
century, neither DOS nor DoD has been able to devise long-term assessments of the 
training and education provided under this program at the departmental or upper 
echeloned bureaucratic levels.18  The Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
constructed a tiered evaluation system for the IMET program, with the top tier (Level V) 
asking about the return on investment.19  The wording of the question itself implies that 
the answer is a number derived by some conventional calculation and amenable to 
expression in some quantitative metric that is accepted by all concerned parties.  
Specifically, GAO asked: “How does the monetary value of results of the program 
compare with the related costs?”20  The GAO then reported that neither DOS nor DoD 
collect any data at this top-level of evaluation.21  The problem is not that either agency 
resists the Congressional mandate to provide metrics and assessments; rather, the trouble 
                                                 
18 United States Government Accountability Office, International Military Education and Training: 
Agencies Should Emphasize Human Rights Training and Improve Evaluations by Charles Michael Johnson, 
Jr., GAO Report 12-123, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), 16. 
United States Government Accountability Office, Security Assistance: Observations on the 
International Military Education and Training Program, Document number GAO/NSIAD-90-215BR, 
(Washington, DC: GAO, 1990), 1. 
United States Government Accountability Office, International Affairs Budget: Framework for 
Assessing Relevance, Priority, and Efficiency, Document number GAO/TNSIAD-98-18, (Washington, DC: 
GAO, 1997), 1. 
19 United States Government Accountability Office, International Military Education and Training, 
26. 
20 United States Government Accountability Office, International Military Education and Training, 
26. 
21 United States Government Accountability Office, International Military Education and Training, 
26. 
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is fixing dollar values to such processes and institutions as “democratic civilian control of 
the military” or “accountability.”  Such problems are further manifest; one hardly need 
note, in the cases of the reform of Iraqi and Afghan security and military forces, 
enterprises which have been vastly more costly than any project undertaken in the past 
two decades in Central and Eastern Europe. 
But how can the DOS and DoD assess such functions with a realistic measure that 
serves the interest of the taxpayer and the defense manager as well as the legislature 
while also offering insights into the actual process of defense institution building with its 
own dynamics and imponderables that makers of policy themselves cannot generalize 
about in practice?  And what determines the “return on investment” when the answer is 
truly subjective in the realms of policy and strategy in a process that exists at the 
intersection of state building, democratization, and security sector reform?  
Although managerial and technocratic elites and their overseers exert great 
pressure to quantify all functions and processes within the government—and for good 
reasons since most projects need benchmarks in order to justify future expenditures—not 
every funding program can produce measurable results of policy and programs within a 
budgeting cycle or even within a five-year plan.  For instance, to state the obvious which 
is nonetheless lost on some interested in the question, the production of a new fighter 
aircraft has different traits than the foundation of a new general staff and high command 
structure in a young democracy escaping the political and institutional legacy of war and 
totalitarianism.  Under current processes of the measurement of means and ends, how 
someone measures the success of foreign assistance and aid then becomes a matter of 
subjectivity borne from budgetary imperatives that require objective results.  This already 
squishy analytical footing is made more perilous by the disciplinary prejudice of the 
metrics’ author, based on their particular area of expertise to the exclusion of others.  
This issue is further evidenced through the process of multi-layered checks and balances 
in the working of a democratic government with its own political forces that are anything 
other than open to quantification as shown by events in politics, society and economy of 
the last decade. 
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C. PFP PROCESS AND PROGRESS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN 
EUROPE 
While the PfP program opened the door for reforms, it was not until 1995, at 
which time the effort began its regularization after the initial burst of activity, that the PfP 
Planning and Review Process (PARP)22 was instituted to “provide a structured basis for 
identifying partner forces and capabilities that could be available to the Alliance for 
multinational training, exercises and operations” while “also serves[ing] as a planning 
tool to guide and measure progress in defence [sic] and military transformation efforts.”23 
The countries participating in the PARP, work with NATO allies to “assess their defense 
capabilities, identify potential contributions to NATO exercises and operations, and select 
specific goals for developing their defense capabilities and building interoperability. 
NATO has made modifications to the Planning and Review Process over time. For 
instance, in 2004, NATO modified the Planning and Review Process’ goals to further 
support defense reform, defense institution building, and the fight against terrorism.”24 
Since inception, thirty-four countries have signed the PfP framework document 
signifying their commitment to the bi-lateral cooperation between the Euro-Atlantic 
partner nations and NATO.  So far, twelve countries have progressed from PfP program 
membership to full NATO membership with all of the new member states coming from 
                                                 
22 The PfP framework establishes an a la carte-style partnership program where the member country 
can choose from over 150 partnership goals.  The PARP framework allows member countries the ability to 
have NATO assess specific goals, defense capabilities, and/or interoperability opportunities through joint 
planning and exercises.  Additionally, the PARP framework constitutes a commitment from the political 
leadership, to their domestic constituency, that defense reforms are conducted reasonably and in a 
measured fashion, with the assistance from outside donors, namely the United States.  The burden-shifting 
of security sector reforms, through PfP, fosters intellectual interoperability while lessening the appearance 
of allocating scarce domestic resources for guns vice butter.  The desired result of the rhetoric is to create a 
strong security posture that reinforces political rewards with minimal domestic costs.  Wallace J. Thies, 
Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-Shifting in NATO, (Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), 14-15.   
23 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process,” 
November 3, 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_68277.htm (accessed January 22, 2012). 
24 United States Government Accountability Office, NATO Partnerships: DOD Needs to Assess U.S. 
Assistance in Response to Changes to the Partnership for Peace Program by Joseph A. Christoff, GAO 
Report 10-1015, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 15. 
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the Baltics, the Balkans, and Central Europe.25  In contrast, for a variety of reasons, there 
has been a noticeable reluctance from NATO to offer full membership among the 
Eurasian PfP countries, including Russia and states on Russia’s immediate borders.  
Meanwhile, seven Eastern European countries26 have remained PfP program members, 
although with disparate reasons for eschewing Article X membership.27 
Whatever their formal relationship to NATO, these seven PfP nation states remain 
significant strategic partners to the United States, especially since the campaign of 
counter terror after 11 September 2001.  Considering such factors as geography and 
policy, their fate influences on the stability of Europe and, hence, to be sure, that of the 
United States; these nation states are also closely linked with the region’s relations and 
fortunes of present day Russia.  For example, the Transcaucasus and the greater Black 
Sea regions provide a strategic element for European energy security.  The production 
and transport of fossil fuels from Central Asia through the Caspian and Black Seas create 
secondary and tertiary energy routes that bypass Russian pipelines and potential 
restrictions of those lines.  Of particular concern are the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline 
that transits Georgia, in addition to transiting Azerbaijan and Turkey, and the Gazprom 
Druzhba and Soyuz pipelines that transit Ukraine. 
While the United States, NATO, the EU, and individual European countries have 
committed resources to ensure the region maintains its overall stability through aid 
                                                 
25 The 12 Partnership for Peace members who were offered and accepted NATO membership: 
Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia.  
26 The seven PfP Eastern European countries, as defined for this thesis as the former Soviet republics, 
remaining outside of NATO membership are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, 
and Ukraine.   
27 There are currently 18 PfP member states that are satisfied with solely a bilateral relationship with 
NATO and do not aspire for full NATO membership: Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Finland, 
Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malta, Moldova, Russia, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.  As such, there are only 4 PfP member states that are actively 
seeking NATO membership with the use of the Membership Action Plan (MAP): Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Macedonia, Georgia, and Montenegro. It should be noted that Georgia has not yet been formally offered a 
MAP, although a formal invitation for NATO membership has been extended.  Consequently, there are 
several European countries that have no NATO or PfP ties or participation: Andorra, Cyprus, Liechtenstein, 
Monaco, San Marino, and the Holy See.  North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Partners,” February 21, 
2012, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/51288.htm (accessed March 21, 2012). 
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programs, the PfP program specifically targets military modernization, interoperability, 
and reform—though not to the exclusion of civil stability, economic growth, and political 
will.  But, regional stability, even though the PfP, cannot be bought on the cheap or 
forced against the will of the people of a particular country.  It must originate from the 
political leadership but supported through the civil will of the people and the legislative 
process of ensuring adequate funding for PfP goals. 
The challenge that Ukraine and Georgia’s political administrations face is being 
able to convince their voters, especially during hard economic times, that additional 
funding for military modernization is valued-added for their country’s domestic defense 
when supporting NATO missions abroad.  Their international desires, no matter where 
they currently lay, have very real local impacts.  Since Ukraine and Georgia, 
economically have only mid-range gross domestic products (GDP), the consumer on the 
street becomes more interested in finding employment and feeding their families as 
opposed to providing security and food to other countries.  While this definitely becomes 
a political concern, it illustrates the value that the PfP program can provide, by 
minimizing the recipient country’s financial requirements, when accompanied with 
funding and other types of gratis support from donor countries.  
D. ASSESSMENT: A PROPOSAL AND A PYRAMID 
The difficulty in measuring success for security assistance programs is that there 
is not a single or consensual management measurement to assess the public activity of 
security.  Success must be measured, if it can even be categorized as an area that be 
adequately assessed, on a whole of government approach based on the overarching 
foreign policy goals of the United States in their complexity.  What lacks in the 
measurement/assessment/success mantra is a clear dictum of a security assistance and 
security cooperation grand strategy concept that echo of the Economic Recovery Plan 
(ERP) of the 1940s, a circumstance that poorly allows comparisons to the multiform 
challenges as have unfolded with security assistance and cooperation since 1989.  The 
world is vastly different environment than it was twenty-five years ago and the United 
States, in the lack of a grand foreign policy strategy, has piecemealed foreign aid on 
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market principles and outsourcing to a thousand points of light as it has become needed.  
The confluence of the multitude of programs, initiatives, and agencies has created a 
confusing and overly bureaucratized environment among branches of government and 
non-government for expending funds in an effort to support the democratization of other 
countries. 
Correcting these problems will not necessarily create an ideal mechanism of 
management and control that directly links every U.S. dollar with concrete results in 
policy and strategy from recipient countries.  This fact derives from the lack of consensus 
in the U.S. government as to what constitutes in reality effective defense institution 
building and because the process of the last twenty years took existing security assistance 
structure oriented to materiel and grafted them onto the ad hoc strategic requirement to 
rebuild central and eastern European defense establishments. Meeting the need for 
verifications and assessments, this author proposes a hierarchal construct with differing 
assessment criteria based on where, on the bureaucratic scale, the U.S. aid actions take 
place. 
Understanding how NATO, and the United States in particular, have handled, 
supported, and provided financial aid for partner countries’ goals of modernizing their 
military structure through a comprehensive defense institution building process is 
essential in determining how we judge progress for these efforts.  The cornerstone of this 
understanding must take into account, from the outset, that progress can only be 
measured based on where a country starts from and where they want to go based on gross 
military outcomes.  One of the primary difficulties in evaluating success is that the funds, 
programs, and assessments are considered in isolation as compared to the total defense 
reform process or more comprehensively under the whole of government approach.  
Understanding how to overcome the disparate programs and initiatives from the various 
funding venues of the U.S. government, within a single methodological concept, can be 
accomplished by using the proposed assessment pyramid in Figure 1. 
The proposed assessment pyramid was crafted on the premise that a 
bureaucratized one-size-fits-all metric missed the basic fundamental concepts that many 
scholars have proffered, that the human element of policy does not directly link to 
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successful and cost effective events at the basic level of military-to-military interactions.  
Each level of bureaucracy provides a unique aspect when identifying if events and funds 
are successful.  The assessment pyramid provided here depicts a hierarchical system that 
applies different assessments for measuring the success of foreign aid and assistance 
programs based on where they lay as compared to their foreign policy goals.  This 
approach aims to evaluate those programs that have quantifiable outcomes to those 
programs that require verification which supports U.S. foreign policy goals within target 
nations.  The examination of U.S. security assistance programs necessitates a broad view 
of success as it is measured up and down the bureaucratic hierarchy of the pyramid. 
 
Figure 1.   Assessment Pyramid (From: 28) 
As the assessments move from the base to the pinnacle they will become harder to 
quantify using objective measures of effectiveness and management customs and 
practice.  The base-level evaluations consider specific tasks and accomplishments from 
                                                 
28 The proposed assessment pyramid is the author’s vision logically to structure the foreign aid and 
assistance and provide a framework for rational assessments based on his understanding of the systematic 
shortfalls inherent in the current process. 
 17
tactical units that are easy to assess given the nature of the events, training, or desired 
interoperability.  Evaluations could consider the type and amount of funding provided 
based on hard outcomes of numbers of people training, hours of instruction, or even units 
equipped.  When assessments move higher up the pyramid, the evaluations convert to 
more subjective verifications based on political desires and goals.  These types of 
verifications must consider the national policy directives as they are applied to the tasks 
given to the tactical and operational commanders.  Success at one level does not 
necessarily imply success at the next level unless it is in line with the strategic and 
national policy goals.  It is essential to ensure the leadership understands that 
comprehensive defense reforms cannot be accomplished without reforms spanning from 
the lowest tactical unit all the way up to the country’s president and parliamentary body. 
The structure of the pyramid results from top-down political directives and goals 
that outline the country’s national security priorities.  These priorities are remolded 
within the Ministry of Defense (MoD) for modernization initiatives, doctrine creation, 
specific military training, and other funding allocations to meet the president’s national 
security desires.  When the DOS foreign policy objectives overlap with the recipient 
country’s national security goals, bi-lateral aid and assistance can be allocated to achieve 
mutually beneficial outcomes. 
Partnership for Peace countries can then leverage aid and assistance programs via 
the establishment of a NATO PARP and/or Annual National Program 
(ANP)/MAP/Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) goals in conjunction with the 
Office of Defense Cooperation’s (ODC) goals, as an extension of the COCOM’s Country 
Campaign Plans.29  These agreements, for funding and other military aid, fulfill the 
MoD’s needs and can be coordinated through the COCOM (EUCOM in this particular 
instance) who will consider which sub-component command, such as Marine Corps 
Forces Europe, will be responsible for the actual execution at the tactical and operational 
levels. 
                                                 
29 The MAP is constructively a political statement of intent that describes the country’s desires for 
membership.  The ANP addresses a multitude of issues, of which defense is only a part of the total 
program.  Conversely, the PARP and IPAP goals are defense driven and specifically address only defense 
related issues.  
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Building the foundation of the pyramid are the collaborative efforts of the ODC 
and EUCOM, using their planning documents (Ambassador Mission goals and the 
Theater Campaign Plan, respectively) to support the recipient country’s national security 
goals, which also supports U.S. foreign policy objectives of helping to build and sustain 
democratic nations.  As mission essential tasks (MET) are created for each planning goal, 
training events and funding can be budgeted according to each of the mission essential 
task lists (METL)—those items deemed to be of necessity to achieve the successful 
completion of the task.  It is at this level that the cornerstone of objectivity resides where 
assessments can be readily and objectively produced under quantifiable terms. 
However, while allocated funding for specific events and the completion of those 
events does not necessarily indicate success in totality, it does provide an indicator for 
where additional funding should be focused for future events.  For instance, a single 
military exercise based on interoperability or language training provided to one person 
will not provide the one-time check-in-box but, will require ongoing and sustained events 
which foster continued knowledge and comprehension until such a time that it becomes 
innate within the particular target area or task.  The growing of the baseline of the 
number of those trained would, in itself, indicate progress toward the next stage and 
would be considered a successful and well-spent activity. 
Once additional task lists are completed, the essential task could be considered 
complete after an evaluative process assesses if the PfP country can perform the task 
autonomously and therefore would graduate from future assistance in that area.  
However, this type of assessment would be circular in nature and could be repeated 
among all of the METs using this constant evaluative process.  The end results would 
reinforce the tactical/operational EUCOM goals and ultimately the PfP PARP goals 
which could be objectively reported to policy makers as progress or even success. 
The DOS structure is laden with both objective and subjective measurements of 
performance and effectiveness.  These factors are not as easily divided between the 
strategic, operational, and tactical goals as they are in the DoD realm.  It would stand to 
reason, though, that the more tactical goals are those that are more easily quantified under 
objective goals—such as those at the base of the pyramid.  The tactical level DOS efforts 
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will prove easier to quantify since Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS) equipment purchases can easily be measured based on the recipient 
country’s needs and success can be measured based on multiple possible criterion such 
as: delivery times of the materiel, sufficient operator training, sale of combined logistics 
packages which includes spares, maintenance training, and warehousing equipment to 
ensure stated readiness requirements based on the recipient countries’ pre-stated goals. 
The IMET program should be considered both a subjective and an objective 
measurement since it provides military and civilian officials English language skills as 
well as educating the IMET recipient on U.S. policy issues and cultural awareness in 
general about the United States.  This can be illustrated with the introductory discussion 
of the interaction with the Ukrainian major.  The measurable result was the completion of 
the Command and Staff School while the subjective nature considers the secondary and 
tertiary benefits of the language training and formal schooling which enhances U.S. 
interoperability for years to come. 
At the top of the DOS scale are the country ambassador’s U.S. foreign policy 
goals that are at the pinnacle of subjectivity where subjectivity is verified against the 
DOS initiatives such as providing economic stability, buying influence, and establishing 
U.S. goodwill for the target nation.  An example of such an initiative was the recent 
launching of the New Economic Opportunities Initiative in Georgia where over $20 
million over a four-year period was earmarked to reduce poverty, improve rural incomes, 
improve food security, and address water concerns in the target communities.30  While 
these projects are worthwhile, finding measurements of effectiveness will prove elusive 
as these are better suited under a verification of efforts that they are providing goodwill to 
Georgia and the Georgian populous at large.  That is the measurement of success, though 
not quantifiable, nor should it be. 
Although the United States and the U.S. embassy civil-military country teams 
effectively track the expenditure of funds for the programs, the method of accountability 
                                                 
30 United States Department of State, “Embassy of the United States: Georgia, Assistance, December 
2011,” http://georgia.usembassy.gov/root/development-aid/usg-assistance-to-georgia-quarterly-
newsletter2.html (accessed February 15, 2012). 
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for individuals charged with executing these funds for specific outcomes is still imperfect 
for the needs of policy.  There is a tremendous effort at all levels of government to ensure 
that Congressional funds are applied specifically for projects within the mandated legal 
boundaries.  Comptrollers and legal advisors work with planners to ensure that fiscal law 
is strictly observed.  COCOMs task subordinate commands to execute funds towards 
their individual priority lists and ambassadors task their staffs to spend funds on in-
country projects.  Although “after action” and “lessons learned” reports are submitted by 
authorities up through the chain of command, no one is held accountable if the project, 
exercise, or program fails other then in a general way.  As long as the money is spent 
legally and the event has finally occurred, it is labeled a success; at most, those in a 
position of authority signify potential areas for improvement for the work of the year to 
come.  However, as of 2011, Congress has now mandated that metrics shall be developed 
and used to justify funds and the progress of current and future programs, although 
Congress has not indicated to what extent these metrics are to be applied or what they 
should look like.  Conceivably though, if metrics are adopted, then organizational 
hierarchies can be held accountable for poorly performing programs.  As a result, if 
greater emphasis were applied to the outcomes and if commanding generals and admirals, 
as well as ambassadors, were held accountable to Congress through the Department 
Secretaries, then greater efforts and focus would be brought to bear to ensure meaningful 
results with reasonable assessment criteria for the foreign aid programs. This could be 
easily brought in line with the assessment pyramid so that measureable evaluations are 
collected at the country-team and COCOM levels, while foreign policy driven outcome-
based goals are measured more on a verification of progress through the ambassador and 
reported to the department secretaries. 
E. SOURCES AND METHODS 
Within Ukraine and Georgia, the early preponderance of literature on specific 
military modernization policies and doctrine has resided largely within national and 
defense policy documents such as national security strategies and defense reviews but 
recently more transparency of their security situation and modernization efforts have 
become available via open source venues. However at this time, Ukraine and Georgia 
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both shared the same initial concerns about their territorial security against a potential 
Russian resurgence and increase of their stated sphere of influence in their near-abroad.  
This was perhaps more of a concern for Georgia than Ukraine since Ukraine was left with 
a significant cache of nuclear ballistic missile and Georgia did not have such a capability. 
The Ukraine and Georgia heads of state have published their national security and 
military strategies, which have provided the basis for their individual modernization 
requirements and needs.  These works represent the strategic political policies for these 
countries while all other strategic doctrine and modernization guidelines are formed from 
the MoD and service strategies.  While each country’s national security goals and 
strategies vary, a common theme resonates among them—the protection of its citizens 
from outside intrusion and territorial integrity.  Although differences are inherent among 
their desired outcomes and approaches toward the same problems, Ukraine and Georgia 
have published in-depth goals specific to modernization efforts which have assisted them 
in identifying specific desired outcomes.  Within the Ukrainian White Book, published 
annually since 2005, and the Georgian Strategic Defense Review (SDR), both countries 
desire complete renovations of their military structures and equipment as well as 
addressing specifics toward meeting the PfP goals of modernizing forces for NATO 
interoperability requirements. 
In addition to the Ukrainian and Georgian national security and military policy 
documents, the internal evaluations of their modernization efforts have been 
supplemented through outside assessments.  Detailed independent evaluations have been 
conducted by Jane’s Security Assessments.  These reports are unbiased reviews of all 
aspects of a country’s military to include manning levels, equipment and hardware 
quantities and conditions along with current in-country events and actions but with 
minimal analytical opinion.  However, the sources for Jane’s Assessments are primarily 
from open-source documents and do not represent in-depth personal reviews of specific 
modernization efforts. 
However, there have been more in-depth assessments of Ukraine and Georgia’s 
modernization efforts.  Both countries have had special assistance from the United States 
and other nations as well, to provide a detailed examination of defense reforms within 
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numerous areas of concern that correspond to individual NATO PfP PARP categories.31  
Aside from the self-interested national policy documents, the Center for Civil-Military 
Relations (CCMR) documents which specifically address the Ukrainian and Georgian 
reforms present the best analytical framework for defense building assessments and are 
used extensively throughout this research.  Additionally, COCOM reviews and 
assessments along with the Ukrainian and Georgian embassy Mission Strategic and 
Resource Plans are considered to evaluate and compare against third-party assessments. 
Building on such sources, his thesis examines Ukraine and Georgia by using a 
comparative study of their proposed modernization proposals against U.S. funding 
assistance and programs that support current U.S. policy.  It will approach the 
examination of these countries’ modernization programs through the lens of three key 
support pillars of logistics32 as the basis for true modernization progress.  It is clear that 
without a comprehensive logistics support network, other modernization efforts will not 
achieve full potential as they will not have the appropriate tools to sustain operational 
readiness or the ability to deploy autonomously for extended periods of time.  Logistics 
also brings policy, planning, and funding together within a country, including major 
outlays and projects.   
                                                 
31 While the PARP review documents are classified, other reports are available that were conducted 
by groups of specialists, sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Naval Postgraduate 
School Center for Civil-Military Relations.  These reviews examined multiple aspects of defense institution 
building reforms within each of the eleven categories and the analytical results are based on subjective, 
though professional, opinions on defense institution building initiatives and whether the target country has 
in reality moved from Soviet-style institutions to NATO compatible institutions. 
32 For this thesis, “logistics” refers to the political manifestation exercised throughout all levels of the 
government’s bureaucracy to include presidential guidance for logistics modernization and value, MoD 
doctrine for the use of logistics, acquisition of equipment and materiel, and sustainment of military forces 
as outlined through a country’s national security goals.  Logistics used in this manner is an extension of 
national policies and as such, culminates the juncture of political desire, popular civilian support, and 
military capability.  A shortfall in any of these three key support pillars will severely impact the military’s 
ability to deploy or even provide domestic humanitarian assistance in times of crisis.  This understanding of 
logistics is comprehensive without providing specific boundaries due to the complex nature of national 
logistics.  The point to be understood is that logistics is not just about pushing parts and supporting the 
warfighter for extended operations at home as well as abroad.  It becomes much more integral to the 
national government’s policy and ability to allocate funds, specifically for military logistics modernization, 
that furthers a country’s national security goals through all levels of the national support element to include 
the president, the legislative bodies, the MoD, the Joint Staff, and the individual services. 
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In other words, a country puts its money where its political and strategic intentions are in 
the realm of logistics.  Thus logistics tends to offer the clearest insights into the progress 
of security reform. 
As the newly independent countries, specifically Ukraine and Georgia, modernize 
their military structures, the need for logistics reform among the three key support pillars 
at all levels is absolutely essential to ensure the new military structure is supported 
organizationally and sustained financially.  The resulting product will attempt to narrow 
the chasm and identify whether the modernization efforts of Ukraine and Georgia have 
been effective given the amount of aid and assistance provided by the United States and 
ultimately determine if the combined assessment provides a better gauge of success than 
the congressionally mandated metrics effort. 
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II. UNITED STATES FOREIGN ASSISTANCE 
 The means to measure generosity to the ends of the national interest form the 
point of departure for this analysis of the character of U.S. security cooperation and the 
way that its overseers and critics measure its effectiveness.  The United States has been a 
long proponent of encouraging democratic-leaning countries to build a state and society 
based on western constitutional principles of good government and thrift.  While some 
countries can be encouraged through verbal support and economic ties, a vast majority of 
others receive this encouragement of democratization through financial aid and assistance 
in the form of food and humanitarian programs, and legal and commerce cooperation, in 
addition to security assistance and cooperation programs. 
The building and modernization of defense and military institutions concerns the 
U.S. and its agencies of security cooperation as much as it does the target country. The 
U.S. Congressional laws under the DOS and DoD Authorization Acts dictate the amount 
of funding available to the departments for foreign assistance.33  Each military or naval 
department is mandated by Congress to work with other foreign assistance agencies when 
assistance goals are similar.  While the DOS is responsible for administering security 
assistance programs and the DoD is responsible for administering security cooperation 
programs, the nuanced differences tend to frequently blend at the consumption-level as 
                                                 
33 Each year, the United States Congress appropriates, through the Foreign Relations Authorization 
Act, billions of dollars for the support of U.S. foreign policy initiatives that are distributed through the 
DOS, DoD, USAID, U.S. International Broadcasting, Peace Corps, and directly into international 
organizations and peacekeeping activities.  Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2012 
(Reported in House –RH), H.R. 2583, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h112-2583 (accessed 
October 18, 2011), 9-11. 
Although all of these programs are funded under one Authorization Act, each sub-division of 
funds creates multiple layers of bureaucracy as dollars are further sub-divided down until they ultimately 
reach the recipient countries.  In many cases, a country will receive funds from multiple lead agencies.  
This decentralized approach leads to a high probability that funds spent within a country could be 
duplicative or even contradictory between funding objectives or more problematic, lack policy coherence.  
United States Government Accountability Office, NATO Partnerships, 36. 
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COCOMs and ODC teams34 work through statutory applications of Title 10 and Title 22 
funds.35  It should be noted that the DOS and DoD Authorization Acts are Fiscal Year 
2012 documents and have not been signed into law as of this writing and are subject to 
Presidential and/or other Congressional changes.  However, despite potential changes in 
particular programmatic funding, the sense of Congress is clear enough that inter-
departmental cooperation, along measureable performance goals, is required. 
Supporting the two departments is a host of sub-organizational agencies that 
provide documentation on how expenditures are budgeted and accounted for.  The DoD’s 
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) provides the throughput and budgeting 
estimates for twelve programs, inclusive of PfP’s WIF.36  Alternatively, DOS’s United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) provides the throughput and 
budgeting estimates for thirteen programs ranging from global health initiatives to law 
                                                 
34 Offices of Defense Cooperation (ODC) can be located anywhere within the host country’s 
governmental structure (generally within the MoD or General Staff) and will have various naming 
conventions although the functionality of these offices remains analogous.  The ODC reports to the 
regional COCOM as well as the Defense Attaché who is located at the U.S. embassy and reports directly to 
the country ambassador. 
35 The Fiscal Year 2012 Foreign Relations Authorization Act authorized over $40 billion of U.S. 
taxpayers’ money to be loaned or given away to other countries.  United States House, Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2012, H.R. 2583.  However, how these funds are allocated and managed 
among the recipient agencies varies widely.  Although standard governmental accounting practices meet 
Congressional mandates on dollar accountability, oversight of how the funds are spent is lacking.  
Comptroller responsibilities are primarily fiduciary to ensure that funds are spent within legal limits and not 
based on whether the spending supports foreign policy goals.  The disconnect between financial 
accountability of foreign assistance and the execution of foreign assistance operations and initiatives 
creates a DoD and DOS policy gap within the management and oversight responsibilities within the 
executing agencies.  This oversight and management gap between operations and comptrollers is not a new 
phenomenon but it becomes acute when security cooperation and security assistance planning are not 
synchronized with fiscal realities from the comptroller, and ultimately Congressional authorizations.  As a 
result, the various agency planning staffs must balance foreign assistance priorities based on available 
funding without the benefit of clear directives from Congress, the Secretary of Defense, or the Secretary of 
State.  Further complications occur when multiple agencies have security cooperation and security 
assistance roles within a target country and the priority of funds rankings for one agency is not analogous to 
another agency’s rankings.  This funds management gap can create unorganized efforts within a recipient 
country that prolong, delay, or even undermine other funding efforts.  
36 United States Department of Defense, “Defense Security Cooperation Agency Operation and 
Maintenance, Defense-Wide Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 Budget Estimates,” accessed August 13, 2011, 
http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2011/budget_justification/pdfs/01_Operation_and_Maintenance
/O_M_VOL_1_PARTS/DSCA_FY11.pdf, slide 17. 
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enforcement to foreign military financing.37  Further subdividing these major programs 
are a host of smaller and targeted programs broken out by country and specific activity.  
While the DSCA and USAID comptroller functions provide the nuanced funding streams 
and budget estimates, they only facilitate the function as bookkeepers and not as 
evaluators of programmatic success. 
Although the Authorization Acts direct close cooperation between the foreign aid 
distributing agencies, a recent GAO report indicated that the DoD specifically needed to 
reassess how funds were being applied toward NATO PfP recipient countries.38  While 
the GAO report was comprehensive in nature, it did not provide any basis or a 
recommendation for performance reviews other than they should be conducted to 
evaluate PfP funding and specifically those funds supporting the WIF.39  The September 
2010 report indicated that the last evaluation of Warsaw Initiative programs was 
conducted in 200140 and expressed the view that a new evaluation should be conducted 
after the publication of the new NATO Strategic Concept.41 The GAO report 
encapsulates the root of the issue.  The changing world environment has changed PfP 
countries’ requirements but the funding mechanisms of the U.S. government have not 
reacted to institute comprehensive modernization efforts through a grand foreign policy 
strategy.   
 
                                                 
37 United States Department of State, “International Affairs Function 150: Fiscal Year 2010 Budget 
Request” accessed August 13, 2011, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/122513.pdf, 5. 
38 United States Government Accountability Office, NATO Partnerships, 36. 
39 In 2010, the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations was concerned about how the PfP 
program changes had evolved in scope and importance over seventeen years as more countries joined 
NATO in the face of a changing strategic environment since the early 1990s.  The GAO responded with a 
report indicating that the DoD needed to reassess how WIF dollars were applied because no formal 
assessment of the WIF program had been conducted since 2001.  Even though WIF comprises only a small 
fraction of the security assistance and security cooperation funds, the lack of a recent assessment illustrates 
the lack of a comprehensive assessment of all funding programs. United States Government Accountability 
Office, NATO Partnerships, in toto. 
40 United States Government Accountability Office, NATO Partnerships, 35. 
41 United States Government Accountability Office, NATO Partnerships, 36. 
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The result is that the personnel and organizations tasked with carrying out Congressional 
requirements attempt, at the best of their ability under legal constraints, to coalesce 
requirements, funding, and the joint foreign policy goals of the United States and the 
recipient country. 
A. HISTORY OF FOREIGN AID 
Before the First World War, the United States generally maintained an isolationist 
stance in its foreign policy, including the provision of non-military aid or resources to 
other countries.  The majority of foreign aid, before this time, was provided by private 
citizens and companies and not by the U.S. government–for example, the humanitarian 
organizations that provided significant assistance for Russian famine relief in the early 
1890s.42  This practice changed amid the severe and immediate humanitarian needs of the 
Europeans resulting from the war’s devastation.  Herbert Hoover, who in 1914 was a 
mining engineer and living in London, helped organize the return of American citizens to 
the United States from Europe.  His valiant efforts did not go unnoticed, and when the 
Germans invaded Belgium, he was appointed the chairman of the Commission for Relief 
in Belgium (CRB), an international organization chartered to provide foodstuffs to 
northern France and Belgium to prevent starvation of the invaded peoples. 
However, Hoover and the CRB no longer were able to provide such assistance 
once the United States entered the war.  As a result, the suffering and privations 
continued; the situation was even worse in Eastern Europe.43  After the war, the full 
extent of the suffering and starvation throughout Europe lead President Woodrow Wilson 
                                                 
42 United States Department of State, “Highlights in the History of U.S. Relations With Russia, 1780-
June 2006,” May 11, 2007, http://www.state.gov/p/eur/ci/rs/200years/c30273.htm (accessed March 25, 
2012). 
43 The need became especially prominent in Poland, and later in Russia, as the German government 
forbade relief efforts to be granted by non-governmental organizations to the civilian population without 
regard to feeding the armies first.  What foodstuffs where available locally were requisitioned by the 
occupying German military forces with little regard for general population.  The result was that the British 
and Allied countries withheld food support based on the viewpoint that support to Poland would ultimately 
result in support to Germany’s war effort since the Germans would take food destined for the Polish 
population.  Matthew Lloyd Adams, “Herbert Hoover and the Organization of the American Relief Effort 
in Poland (1919—1923),” In European Journal of American Studies, No. 2, September 29, 2009, 
http://ejas.revues.org/7627 (accessed January 3, 2012), 2-3. 
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to enact the first U.S. foreign aid program, the American Relief Administration (ARA), in 
February 1919, using $5 million in discretionary funds.44  Later that year, Congress 
appropriated $100 million for ARA efforts and relief credits for Europe.45  The ARA 
continued to provide foodstuffs for Europe, excluding Russia, for the next three years and 
sustained operations in Russia until 1923 as a U.S. political effort to undermine the 
Bolsheviks and Vladimir Lenin.46  Although the foreign aid support to Europe was 
limited in nature and duration, it set the precedent for future financial aid to countries in 
need along with the new notion of providing carrot-and-stick support to countries that do 
not willingly yield to U.S. desires or national interests. 
Both aspects of U.S. aid blossomed after the Second World War, and foreign aid 
has remained a key instrument in U.S. foreign policy ever since.  However, unlike the 
ARA credit provisions to Europe in 1919, the 1941 Lend-Lease Act, signed into law by 
President Franklin Roosevelt, provided a majority of the aid gratis or with heavily 
discounted prices.  The Lend-Lease Act was instrumental in providing much-needed 
materiel to Allied forces from 1941–1945 illustrating the current and future needs for 
close military cooperation among friendly nations.  These efforts primarily supported 
Britain, France, and the Soviet Union financially and materially, which helped the Allies 
defeat the Nazis. 
The end of the Second World War shifted U.S. policy makers’ focus from the 
waging of war to the building of a stable peace via the European reconstruction efforts 
and the eventual creation of the ERP in 1947.47  The ERP was designed as a multi-year 
economic aid and recovery package intended to rebuild the devastated European 
continent by providing immediate aid for recovery projects while creating the fiscal 
environment for a market-based economic system through investments.  The financial aid 
                                                 
44 Adams, “Herbert Hoover,” 3. 
45 Adams, “Herbert Hoover,” 4. 
46 Adams, “Herbert Hoover,” 13. 
47 The European Recovery Plan was also referred to as the Marshall Plan, named after the, then 
Secretary of State, George Marshall. 
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was provided, under the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1948,48 to European countries 
so that they could increase domestic production, expand foreign trade, and “establish and 
maintain equitable rates of exchange and to bring about the progressive elimination of 
trade barriers.”49  These goals were coupled with U.S. required sales quotas for shipping 
and grain purchases as a requirement of the aid package.50  This arrangement created a 
doubly beneficial outcome for the United States, one as a foreign policy success and the 
other an economic success. 
The aid package required the Western European countries to work together, which 
stabilized the continent politically and militarily, and it created an economic boom for 
U.S. companies providing basic staples and reconstruction supplies.  A result from the 
U.S. domestic standpoint was that foreign aid and assistance not only helped the recipient 
country but also provided to secure U.S. jobs and economic growth.  This outcome was 
not surprising, as it led to continued industrial growth, which helped to employ millions 
of returning soldiers after the war. The effect was that foreign aid was perceived to be 
good for the U.S. and created a liberal consumer-driven democracy for the recipient 
country. This win-win scenario for all became manifest in the minds of policy makers for 
future aid programs.  Additionally, the end of the Second World War placed the Unites 
States in a unique and remarkable situation as the preeminent global economic and 
military superpower, which led to a major shift in foreign policy with European and 
Asian nations.  In addition to becoming a new superpower, the United States now had the 
ability and responsibility to orchestrate events toward the promotion of democracy and 
peace in order to avoid another major global conflict. 
                                                 
48 The Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 was also inclusive of the Truman Doctrine which begat the 
first instance of funded aid in support of the Kennan “containment” policy whereby $400 million was 
provided to Greek government, after the British pulled out their support, to stave off the growing 
communist threat during the Greek Civil War.  United States Department of State, “The Truman Doctrine, 
1947,” accessed March 23, 2012, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/TrumanDoctrine 
49 World Bank, “The Foreign Assistance Act of 1948,” accessed March 25, 2012, 
http://www.worldbank.org/research/1948/08/3115409/foreign-assistance-act-1948. 
50 World Bank, “The Foreign Assistance Act of 1948.” 
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From 1947 to 1952, the United States provided, by way of the ERP, $13.3 billion 
for assistance and aid to Western Europe.51  Specifically, West Germany received the 
greatest preponderance of ERP assistance, totaling $6.5 billion,52 although Britain and 
France received larger amounts in total, through other assistance programs, which 
included loans.  The effect of the ERP and the associated loan programs place a 
stranglehold on Europe to bend to the U.S. will of cooperation and reconstruction which 
eschewed the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc countries from participating in the ERP 
program as they viewed it as American economic imperialism.  This refusal of the 
program by these countries further promoted the aid equals democratization belief since 
many of these countries became autocracies. 
On the other front of the war, the United States did not create an analogous plan 
for Japan for a variety of reasons.  Still, the United States provided other aid to rebuild 
and democratize the new, post-war Japan—to the tune of $2.2 billion in the same period 
(1947–1952).53  These programs represented a new and continuing foreign policy 
commitment for the United States and signified a sustained and intensive U.S. 
involvement in the affairs of its new allies. 
The conceptual framework to provide grants and loans to civilian populations 
along with food, natural resources, farming material, and other relief supplies invoked the 
basic responsibility to provide compassion and assistance to promote goodwill and, 
hopefully, a strong socio-economic relationship as a bulwark against the growing 
                                                 
51 While the Marshall Plan was offered to both Allied and Axis Powers, the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Bloc countries did not accept any of the aid package.  
52 The total German package of aid and assistance overlapped the Marshall Plan due to the initially 
funding from the Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA).  The Marshall plan provided for 
$4.3 billion and the GARIOA provided for $2.2 billion.  These figures would represent $45 billion in 
adjusted 2005 dollars. 
United States Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, U.S. Occupation Assistance: Iraq, 
Germany and Japan Compared by Nina M. Serafino, Curt Tarnoff, and Dick K. Nanto, CRS Report 
RL33331, (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, March 23, 2006), 4. 
53 The Government of Japan accepted Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) funds 
totaling $2.2 billion, or $15.2 billion in adjusted 2005 dollars.  United States Library of Congress, 
Congressional Research Service, U.S. Occupation Assistance: Iraq, Germany and Japan Compared, 5. 
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communist threat.54  This anti-communist stance of Kennan’s containment policy 
remained the focal point for foreign aid disbursements throughout the globe until the late 
1980s55 and became representative of the ERP and Japanese successes for reconstruction 
without communism.   
B. DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND 
THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961  
A decade or so later, formal policy and assistance doctrine was centralized and 
regularized through the FAA of 1961.  The FAA grew out of the need to streamline and 
rationalize the foreign aid process, which had become a fixture of U.S. foreign policy in 
the years after the ERP.  President John F. Kennedy summarized the state of affairs for 
foreign aid in 1961 when he addressed Congress: 
For no objective supporter of foreign aid can be satisfied with the existing 
program—actually a multiplicity of programs.  Bureaucratically 
fragmented, awkward and slow, its administration is diffused over a 
haphazard and irrational structure covering at least four departments and 
several other agencies. The program is based on a series of legislative 
measures and administrative procedures conceived at different times and 
for different purposes, many of them now obsolete, inconsistent, and 
unduly rigid and thus unsuited for our present needs and purposes. Its 
weaknesses have begun to undermine confidence in our effort both here 
and abroad.56 
President Kennedy signed the formal Foreign Assistance Act into Law in September 
1961.  The new law reorganized all non-military aid programs under the newly created 
USAID while leaving military aid programs structured under the DoD. 
Since then, the Foreign Assistance Act has been amended multiple times along 
with annual revisions.  Additionally, further government reorganizations aligned the 
USAID as a fully independent agency under the cognizance of the State Department.  As 
                                                 
54 United States Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Foreign Aid: An Introduction 
to U.S. Programs and Policy by Curt Tarnoff, CRS Report R40213, (Washington, DC: Office of 
Congressional Information and Publishing, February 10, 2011), 3. 
55 United States Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Foreign Aid: An Introduction 
to U.S. Programs and Policy, 2. 
56 United States Agency for International Development, “USAID History,” November 18, 2011, 
http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/data/detailed.html (accessed January 4, 2012). 
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a result, the Foreign Assistance Act currently provides funding through annual 
appropriations to the State Department, USAID, the Peace Corps, along with many 
smaller sub-agencies and organizations.  Congress declared that the “principle objective 
of the foreign policy of the United States is the encouragement and sustained support of 
the people of developing countries in their efforts to acquire the knowledge and resources 
essential to development and to build the economic, political, and social institutions 
which will improve the quality of their lives.”57  The State Department’s response to such 
lofty guidelines was to establish aid programs with five primary objectives: Peace and 
Security, Investing in People, Governing Justly and Democratically, Economic Growth, 
and Humanitarian Assistance.58 
Annual appropriations are now directed under five primary types of aid (Bilateral 
Development, Economic Aid, Humanitarian Assistance, Multilateral Development, and 
Military Assistance),59 which do not generally correlate directly to the DOS objectives.60  
Under each type of aid are multiple programs designated for a specific allocation of 
funding based on the Congressional mandate of the annual appropriations.  The varied 
types of aid used for multiple objectives create the condition for a single type of aid to be 
applied across one or more objectives.  For instance, under the Military Assistance aid 
type, FMF can only be used for the Peace and Security objective, while under the 
Bilateral Development aid type, the Andean Counterdrug Initiative can be used across all 
five objectives.  This cross-pollination between objectives and aid types is best illustrated 
through the Foreign Assistance Framework matrix, Figure 2.  The difficulty is 
                                                 
57 Foreign Relations and Intercourse, U.S. Code, Title 22 (2010), sec 101. 
58 United States Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Foreign Aid: An Introduction 
to U.S. Programs and Policy, 4. 
59 The five types of aid are grouped under the DOS’s Foreign Operations appropriation category.  The 
DOS also has four other categories of appropriations: State (Administration of Foreign Affairs, 
International Organizations, Related Appropriations, and International Commissions), Broadcasting Board 
of Governors, Related Agencies, and Other.  United States Library of Congress, Congressional Research 
Service, State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2012 Budget and Appropriations by Susan 
B. Epstein and Marian Leonardo Lawson, CRS Report R41905, (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional 
Information and Publishing, January 6, 2012), 19.  
60 United States Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Foreign Aid: An Introduction 
to U.S. Programs and Policy, 8. 
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recognizing which objective the type of aid is supporting and to associate effectiveness of 
the program under the various DOS objectives.  While it is understandable that in any 
program, there can be instances for some overlap, too much overlapping creates vague 
goals and even less clear objective measurements of success. 
Although the DOS and USAID provide a wide variety of aid initiatives under the 
Peace and Security objective, these are formally described as Security Assistance 
programs with the preponderance of funds devoted to FMF, FMS, and IMET.  These 
categories of funding are solicited from the DOS by embassies as an avenue for building 
partnership military capacity in order to provide for stable defense intuitions for emerging 
democratic or post-Communist transitional governments.  The planning and funding for 
specific country requirements generally undertook a three-year planning cycle, which 
allowed for a comprehensive vetting process prior to the release of funds or materiel.61  
This vetting process would appear to provide adequate oversight of what the funds are 
spent on considering the $10.4 billion allocated for the FY12 DOS security assistance 
budget, a 28-percent increase from the previous year.62
                                                 
61 Sharif Calfee, Joseph Lee, Peter Crandall, and Young Rock An, “Security Cooperation, Security 
Assistance, and Building Partner Capacity: Enhancing Interagency Collaboration,” in Joint Forces 
Quarterly, No.61, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2011), 103. 
62 United States Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, State, Foreign Operations, and 
Related Programs: FY2012 Budget and Appropriations, 25. 
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Figure 2.   Department of State Foreign Assistance Framework Chart from the DOS Strategic Plan.(From: 63) 
                                                 
63 United States Department of State, Strategic Plan: Fiscal years 2007-2012, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), 58. 
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C. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION PROGRAM 
However, unlike the lengthy vetting process of the DOS, the Defense Department 
is required by law to execute funds within the fiscal year of appropriation.64  Before 
2005, the DoD maintained a secondary position within the military assistance programs 
under the State Department’s 1961 FAA mandate65 that the “Secretary of State shall be 
responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of economic assistance, 
military assistance, and military education and training programs.”66  However, following 
the September 2001 terrorist attacks, the urgency for building partner capacity for 
counter-terrorism efforts dramatically increased.67  The call for rapid reactions against 
future attacks ran up against the slow and deliberate nature of the State Department’s 
processes and led senior DoD officials to examine other alternatives. 
Defense Department leaders recognized that while the DOS was not able to react 
quickly enough to combat the emerging threats, the DOS did have many capabilities that 
were lacking in the military—for example, language capability and cultural background 
expertise.  The inter-agency discussions lead to a 2005 proposal that provided for a DoD-
funded and DoD-lead “‘Global Train and Equip’ authority to increase U.S. support for 
foreign military and security forces in order to disrupt terrorist networks, to build the 
capacity of legitimate states to provide security within their sovereign territory to prevent 
                                                 
64 While the annual appropriation for defense is mandated by law, there are some programs authorized 
by Congress which allows for longer-term funding such as major weapon system acquisitions and 
construction projects. 
65 Prior to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Defense Department did provide direct military 
assistance to friendly nations.  Initially, this was provided under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act 
(MDAA) of 1949 which permitted military aid for the original 11 North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 
members along with Turkey, Greece, Korea, Iran, Taiwan, and the Philippines.  The MDAA was followed 
by the Military Security Acts of 1951 and 1954 and remained under the DoD cognizance until 1961.  
United States Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Department of Defense Role in 
Security Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress by Nina M. Serafino, CRS 
Report RL34639, (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, December 9, 
2008), 10. 
66 Foreign Relations and Intercourse, U.S. Code 2382, Title 22 (2010), sec 622(c). 
67 Calfee, et al, “Security Cooperation, Security Assistance, and Building Partner Capacity,” 103. 
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terrorists from establishing footholds, and to build the capacity of legitimate states to 
participate in U.N., regional, and U.S. coalition military missions.”68 
This proposal, which also required DOS concurrence, received high praise from 
both the Secretaries of Defense and State and was enacted as Section 1206, Global Train 
and Equip Program (GTEP), for Fiscal Year 2006.  Congress approved of the missions 
for Section 1206 of training and equipping partner nations in counter-terrorism operations 
and/or supporting military and stability operations “in which the U.S. armed forces 
participate,” but it did not provide any additional funding.69  As a result, the DoD had to 
reallocate $100 million from its Operations and Maintenance (O&M) account during 
FY06 and another $274 million during FY07.70  Beginning in Fiscal Year 2008, Congress 
increased the DoD’s O&M account to reflect the increase for the Section 1206 funds.71 
Also new in FY06, Congress instituted a Section 1207 program that allowed the 
DoD to “transfer to the State Department up to $100 million per fiscal year in defense 
articles, services, training or other support for reconstruction, stabilization, and security 
activities in foreign countries.”72  Other provisions authorized by Section 1207 included 
DoD funding of the DOS Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization 
along with funding additional activities in other agencies such as the USAID.73  Similar 
                                                 
68 United States Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Security Assistance Reform: 
“Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress by Nina M. Serafino, CRS Report RS22855, 
(Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, January 12, 2012), 3. 
69 United States Government Accountability Office, International Security: DOD and State Need to 
Improve Sustainment Planning and Monitoring and Evaluation for Section 1206 and 1207 Assistance 
Programs by Joseph A. Christoff, GAO Report 10-431, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 
2010), 1. 
70 United States Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Security Assistance Reform: 
“Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress, 12. 
71 United States Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Security Assistance Reform: 
“Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress, 12. 
72 United States Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Department of Defense 
“Section 1207”Security and Stabilization Assistance: Background and Congressional Concerns, FY2006-
FY2010 by Nina M. Serafino, CRS Report RS22871, (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional 
Information and Publishing, March 3, 2011), 1. 
73 United States Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Department of Defense 
“Section 1207”Security and Stabilization Assistance, 1. 
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to the Section 1206, GTEP, Section 1207 was not initially funded by Congress and 
required the DoD to reallocate funds from the O&M account for three fiscal years.74  
Beginning in FY09, Congress increased the DoD’s baseline funding to reflect the 
mandated transfers.  In FY10, the Congressional authority expired and Section 1207 
officially ended.  However, it was replaced by a new DOS program, the Complex Crisis 
Fund (CCF), which enables the “USAID and the Department of State to meet emergent 
requirements that fall under their purview without relying on the Department of 
Defense.”75 
The annual appropriation for the DoD Section 1206 group of programs, termed 
all-inclusively under Security Cooperation, created a new concept of applying funds to 
programs by partnering with DOS for concurrence and even implementation in some 
instances.  This inter-departmental cooperation has become known as the dual-key 
decision-making process as it restricts having one department act unilaterally for military 
assistance as it relates to foreign policy.  Although this new process for military 
assistance is not perfect, it has allowed for rapid responses to threats that the DOS 
framework would not be capable of.  Ukraine and Georgia have received just over $30 
million through the dual-key process, $12 million and $18 million respectively, of the 
nearly $1 billion provided globally between 2006 and 2009 with the greatest allocation of 
funds provided to Pakistan and Lebanon, equating to over 30 percent of the total Section 
1206 funds.76 
The most prominent security cooperation programs include the Section 1206, 
GTEP; the Section 1206, Build Capacity of Foreign Military Forces; the WIF; and 
bilateral/regional military exercises with partner nations.  Although these programs are 
DoD-specific, there are frequent mission overlaps with DOS priorities, even beyond 
those required from the Section 1206 funds, which still require ambassadorial permission 
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for DoD activities.  These programs are normally conducted with the embassy’s Office of 
Defense Cooperation or the senior military advisor on the embassy staff. 
D. FOREIGN AID AND ASSISTANCE ISSUES 
While the inter-departmental coordination appears seamless, there are three issues 
between these entities, which create conflict.  Although each issue does not indicate a 
single failure in the system, the combination of all of the issues creates an environment in 
which funds are not used as effectively as possible. 
Perhaps the most problematic issue facing security cooperation programs is the 
limited nature of funding, which affects how long-term projects can be sustained.  The 
State Department goals outlined under Section 901 of the FAA state more than once that 
U.S. foreign assistance goals77 should be achieved through ongoing economic support, 
sustainment of the global environment, and reinforcement of strategic partnerships, which 
all indicate long-term, multi-year planning and execution.78  This approach is generally 
not an issue for the State Department, which is not restricted by one-year budget 
obligations.  In contrast, for the Defense Department, appropriations require funding to 
be allocated and spent within one fiscal year.  As a result, long-term financial planning by 
the DoD or by recipient nations is limited by the ability and/or the willingness of either 
the DoD or the recipient country to sustain new projects or capabilities based on the 
limited nature of the DoD funding.79  According to a GAO Report, only 26 percent of the 
Section 1206 project proposals explicitly addressed the “recipient countries’ ability to 
sustain the projects, and nine (7 percent) of the 135 proposals provided specific estimates 
of the costs involved.”80  While the report concluded that “sustainment risks appear 
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minimal,”81 the DoD’s efforts in this regard could be provided indefinitely providing that 
funding is reallocated from its baseline.  Such a measure becomes challenging when 
defense budgets are subjected to annual budget cycles that are influenced by 
Congressional politics, economic constraints, and defense reductions which impact long-
term planning efforts.  Moreover, this becomes particularly problematic considering that 
76 percent of the Section 1206 projects are conducted in low GDP income countries.82  
As a result, the fiscal constraints within these low GDP countries prohibit them from 
making up for U.S. funding variances for security assistance/cooperation programs unless 
they approach or are approached from more willing countries.  This situation again 
presents the problem of other foreign involvement which may not support U.S. values or 
foreign policy goals. 
The overlap of programming and prerogatives between DOS and DoD constitutes 
another problem of creating funding confusion among foreign policy executors.  On one 
hand, the inter-departmental collaboration has been viewed favorably as it provides for a 
multi-perspective approach for assistance programs.  The DOS relies on ambassadors to 
support the U.S. government’s policy initiatives in a bilateral process based on country-
specific needs.83  Alternatively, the DoD relies on COCOMs to promote U.S. military 
policies for regional and/or theater perspectives utilizing bi-lateral or multi-lateral 
approaches.84  Because Congress has required that DOS and DoD must collaborate for 
security assistance programs, the COCOM-ambassador relationship allows for varying 
viewpoints and consultations on priorities of efforts.  The use of the dual-key decision-
making process establishes a “mutually beneficial architecture for enhanced collaboration 
between Defense and State in future SA [security assistance] and SC [security 
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cooperation] activities.”85  However, the increased collaboration does not necessarily 
mean that mutually beneficial security assistance and security cooperation activities 
provide the beneficiary the best assistance, nor should it suggest that the collaboration 
works smoothly.  Because the funding for specific activities can actually cross between 
DOS and DoD, as shown by the Marine Corps’ Title 10 and Title 22 Spectrum of 
Security Activities Chart, Figure 3, a heightened level of legal scrutiny is required to 
ensure that appropriated funds are spent within the legal guidelines and limitations for 
both departments and in accordance with the FAA.86  As a result, increased military 
collaboration equates to increased military presence and funding within a designated 
country.  This aspect is not always welcomed by the embassy staff, for broader reasons of 
the civil-military balance as well as out of the widely held perception that many military 
practitioners are poorly-trained87 and lack experience either in the region, in diplomatic 
skills, or both.88  In the event, military personnel are variously well educated and trained 
for foreign assistance missions, and this fact, coupled with short rotational tours, often 
hamstrings the military in terms of the actual value provided to ambassadors, the host 
nation, and the overall U.S. national goals for that country. 
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Figure 3.   Spectrum of Security Cooperation Activities (From: the Marine Corps 
Security Cooperation Handbook.89) 
Collectively, the DOS and DoD have “incorporated little monitoring and 
evaluation for Section 1206 and 1207 programs,”90 even though both agencies are 
required to provide performance metrics. The Central Command (CENTCOM) 
Commanding General formally non-concurred with the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy when he declared that creating performance metrics would be “an unplanned and 
unresourced mission that ‘would require many currently unavailable man-hours’…and 
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‘would communicate to our partners that we do not trust them to utilize capabilities 
provided to them.’”91  Although the Inspector General (IG) team acknowledged that 
performance metrics could become “burdensome,” the published report provided an 
example of how performance metrics could be applied.92  However, the examples 
provided were narrow in scope and illustrated only those particular activities that could 
be measured readily.93  Further, the 2009 IG report noted under their Observation 
Number 9 that metrics had been initiated for Section 1206 programs yet the “initiated 
metrics” were actually “Section 1206 program officials… [announcing] plans to establish 
metrics to measure.”94  As of this writing, those metrics still have not been published, if 
they have even been established.  However, despite the shortfall in documented 
assessments or metrics, the Section 1206 and other military assistance programs have 
expanded each year without the DoD or DOS defining performance measurements.95 
The culmination of unpredictable long-term funding for supporting low GDP 
country initiatives, along with limited experience of embassy and ODC military staff to 
leverage the intricate and overlapping details of assigning funding streams to projects, 
combined with a dearth of understanding of what initiatives actually can be evaluated 
with objective metrics creates the perfect storm for the disassociation between goals, 
ends, and means. 
E. PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE  
The fall of the Soviet Union  in 1991 brought about a dramatic ending to the Cold 
War and threw open new arenas to NATO in central and eastern Europe.  From a political 
                                                 
91 United States Department of Defense, Interagency Evaluation of the Section 1206 Global Train and 
Equip Program, 41. 
92 United States Department of Defense, Interagency Evaluation of the Section 1206 Global Train and 
Equip Program, 41. 
93 United States Department of Defense, Interagency Evaluation of the Section 1206 Global Train and 
Equip Program, 40. 
94 United States Department of Defense, Interagency Evaluation of the Section 1206 Global Train and 
Equip Program, 40. 
95 United States Government Accountability Office, International Security, 5. 
 44
standpoint, the Soviet Union’s collapse was a victory for Western democracies.  
However, from a security assistance standpoint, the dissolution of the bi-polar world 
produced a security vacuum, orphaned armies and soldiers, as well as many unstable 
governments in the former Soviet Union and the Soviet sphere of influence.  This fact 
created a new and immediate need for security assistance and humanitarian aid for the 
collapsing economies—a foreign aid role that the United States was uniquely able to 
provide.  The past five decades of direct foreign assistance illustrated to Congress and the 
American people at large, that overseas involvement through military cooperation and 
financial support constituted a democratizing evolution.  An extension of this mindset 
was capitalized upon once the newly independent countries emerged and U.S. aid and 
assistance had become the cornerstone of the U.S. foreign policy goals in order to 
transform these states into Westernized democracies.  From the outset with the North 
Atlantic Cooperation Council, then, the PfP program became the chief venue to 
determine which states would warrant bi-lateral funding if they were willing to move 
toward NATO and Western principles in general. 
In a way, the wise men of the Alliance had anticipated the possibility of an end of 
the Cold War decades earlier.  According to the 1967 Harmel Report, the Atlantic 
Alliance maintains two primary functions, with the first function “to maintain adequate 
military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure 
and to defend the territory of member countries if aggression should occur.”96  The 
second function is borne out of the first as it permits for dialogue when the conditions of 
the first function are met and allows “for progress towards a more stable relationship in 
which the underlying political issues can be solved.”97  These two aspects were based on 
preconceived notions that the Soviet Union and the United States would the arbiters for 
peace in Europe. 
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As the post-Cold War order emerged in central and eastern Europe, a new debate 
regarding “NATO’s proper role in the new Europe, its relation to other European security 
organizations, and how or whether it could stabilize the East soon replaced the issue of 
whether NATO could continue to exist now that its adversary had withdrawn.”98  The 
new NATO rhetoric which emerged from the 1989 Brussels summit indicated that NATO 
should seek new relations between the East and the West99 which was further defined by 
the Bush Administration’s Secretary of State James Baker who stated that NATO desired 
a whole and free Europe “based on Western values.”100  The change in threat culminated 
with a change in mission and policy, moving from strategic defense to unification under 
Western values.  Additionally, a new strategic concept was introduced during the Rome 
summit that called for “smaller, more mobile forces that stood at lower levels of 
readiness.”101 
It became clear the world environment had changed and NATO must change as 
well or face becoming superannuated.  This reality was not lost among trans-Atlantic 
policy makers and a new NATO Strategic Concept (1991) was formalized to address the 
issues of the rapidly changing security environment.  Western political leaders of the time 
recognized that NATO needed to become the “key security institution of the new era and 
the fact that NATO was to be involved in the promotion of good domestic institutions in 
the former Communist states.”102  Member states of NATO encouraged the emerging 
eastern European and Central Asian democracies to fully utilize other European 
institutions, with their efforts to transition to liberal democratic policies,103 such as the 
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Western European Union (WEU), the EU, the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE) in addition to the United Nations (UN) and the United States.104 
Despite the changes in NATO’s new Strategic Concept and the millions of dollars 
in aid and assistance provided by outside agencies, the former Communist countries 
desired for NATO membership since they believed that holding NATO membership with 
the Article V105 assurances would protect them against any future Russian aggression.  
Invariably, the discussion of NATO enlargement ensued in Washington and the question 
of how to increase membership without excluding or inciting Russia was the key. 
The NATO expansion issue occupied much of Bill Clinton’s presidency and he 
and his administration adamantly worked with the allies to determine who should be 
included in the NATO expansion along with the timing of the inclusion.  While most 
Europeans were in favor of expansion, France was the exception whom adamantly 
opposed any NATO expansion eastward.106  The Clinton administration embarked on a 
domestic and international, primarily with Russia, crusade to fight for the acceptance of 
NATO expansion. 
During the course of working the expansion issue, the Balkans erupted with an 
ethnic civil war.  This new European crisis was met with paralysis inside NATO.  The 
United States, as the most powerful ally, wished to remain outside active involvement for 
a strictly “European” problem and instead supported United Nations peacekeeping and 
humanitarian missions.107  Conversely, many Europeans viewed the increasing violence 
and unrest as the most horrific actions to take place on European soil since the 1940s.108  
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Even though the violence was escalating, the real issue that faced NATO was that there 
was no clear mandate to help in the former Communist Balkans. 
Because Yugoslavia and the subsequent break off countries were not members of 
NATO, there was no precedent to intercede.  However, the United States and other 
NATO members did eventually send in peacemaking forces, along with a substantial 
number of forces from Ukraine.  The Ukrainian UN Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) 
contingent arrived in July of 1992 with approximately 1,300 personnel and remained on 
station until the end of 1995.109  Despite the fact that the Armed Forces of Ukraine 
(AFU) did not even have a signed military policy that outlined operational procedures, 
especially in the area of peacekeeping operations, prior to their assignment to the 
Balkans, the Ukrainians still deployed with the main tasks of: “providing security for 
humanitarian cargo convoys, facilitating of ceasing combat actions and improvement of 
security situation, and patrolling.”110 
Throughout the Balkan crises, several countries expressed desires to join NATO, 
especially Poland, but the Clinton Administration moved slowly on the matter while 
trying to identify a possible response from Moscow.  However, in August 1993, “Russian 
President Boris Yeltsin and Polish President Lech Walesa signed a communiqué stating 
that Moscow did not object to Poland joining NATO.”111  This gesture opened the door 
for more aggressive talks between NATO and potential new members, including Russia, 
which now changed the political landscape.112  The Clinton Administration continued to 
work on the expansion issue as well which led to the U.S. initiative for a new “continent-
wide security” umbrella under the PfP program.113   
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The impetus of the program was to provide cooperation but, it lacked the prime need of 
the Eastern European countries – full NATO membership and the security guarantee. 
Government elites in Washington strongly favored PfP vice full NATO 
membership since PfP would not increase U.S. costs and potential military intervention 
needlessly.114  The debate on whether to give full membership or a partner membership 
under PfP and with which nations, became a Washington battleground as each politician 
had their own agenda.  The internal battle was waged on both sides of the Atlantic but 
eventually, the agreed upon action was to provide for a limited NATO expansion to the 
Visegrád countries, instituting PfP as a potential pathway under the MAP for full NATO 
membership, and to create a special NATO-Russia consultation group.115 
The PfP program reflects the most recent evolution of foreign aid and assistance 
as it is applied through the multilateral institution of NATO with strong bilateral 
interactions that support ANP and PARP goals along with U.S. foreign policy goals.  
Ukraine and Georgia represent good case studies of how bilateral aid is provided to target 
countries based U.S. political strategies along with the individual national desires of 
modernization, westernization, democratization, and security sector reform through the 
formal process of the PfP program. 
F. CONCLUSION 
United States foreign aid has consistently been applied to assist target nations 
with humanitarian, economic, and military aid providing that the assistance benefits the 
long-term economic and military goals of the United States foreign policy goal of 
“building and sustaining democratic, well-governed states.”116  Since the implementation 
of the ERP, the United States has been the largest single donor of foreign aid in the 
world,117 with more than $587 billion disbursed worldwide.118  Although the 
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Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reports that even 
though the U.S. donations are the largest of the twenty-two member nations that comprise 
the OECD, the U.S. aid is the smallest by a percentage of the gross national income 
(GNI).119  However, OECD figures do not include any military assistance programs, 
which would skew the data set.  Additionally, these nations do not spend nearly as much 
on defense as does the United States which permits them to apply resources elsewhere, 
such as in foreign assistance. 
Despite what outside organizations may say about U.S. aid, the fact remains that 
U.S. military assistance applied through the DOS and DoD programs provide much 
needed support for target countries.  Since 1993, the DOS and DoD have provided more 
than $3.4 billion in military aid to Ukraine and Georgia.  While the bulk of the aid, about 
90 percent, is disbursed from the DOS and USAID security assistance programs, the 
DoD’s security cooperation programs still provide basic and necessary bilateral 
opportunities to strengthen these countries’ militaries. 
Given that such a large percentage of funds allocated comes from the DOS, the 
concerns of shortfalls of the annual Section 1206 funding is minimized since so many of 
the DoD and DOS programs overlap missions and can share funding under certain 
circumstances.  To thwart the bureaucratic issues of the dual-key oversight and 
management, a new and clear Congressional policy should be enacted along with access 
to additional training for military and embassy staffers on how to use these funds 
collaboratively.  While these steps would definitely help the application of funds for 
specific programs, establishing performance metrics appears to be the focus from 
Congress all the way down the COCOMs and embassies. 
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III. UKRAINE 
 With its own tragic history in the Twentieth Century, Ukraine is a pivot country 
that bridges between Europe, Russia, and the Caucasus region.  The political leadership 
elected in 2011 under Viktor Yanukovych, desires to keep Ukraine in a neutral position 
among these three forces in an attempt to harness benefits from every arena possible. 
Ukraine accepts aid from the United States, Europe, and Russia, modernization and 
democratization efforts that are mutually beneficial for Ukraine and the United States 
focus on stability and security.  While the main U.S. foreign policy goal for Ukraine is to 
maintain and foster a constructive bilateral relationship, helping build Ukraine’s 
emerging democracy will showcase the country as a model for its neighbors.120 Ukraine’s 
transition to a full market economy is still afflicted with corruption and crony capitalism, 
and recent democratic backsliding has downgraded the country’s Freedom House index 
from free to partially free,121  but Ukraine’s military still desires to modernize its forces 
and equipment with close cooperation of the U.S. and NATO.  The challenge that the 
United States faces is how to capture the effectiveness of the funding provided for the 
military modernization and Defense Institution Building (DIB) efforts while supporting 
the ambassador’s foreign policy goals. 
A. UKRAINIAN FOREIGN ASSISTANCE  
The United States has been a large contributor of aid and assistance to Ukraine 
since 1992 with the first aid provided, $55.9 million, under the DOS Commodity Credit 
Corporation Food for Progress initiative that not only provided food but demonstrated a 
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willingness to support the newly independent countries.122  A partial listing of U.S. aid 
programs have provided in excess of $920 million since FY07 (and budgeted through 
FY12)123 from DOS Foreign Operations Assistance under the five primary DOS areas of 
focus124 and the DoD Section 1206, WIF, and Civil Engagement125 programs.  In toto, 
Ukraine has received more than $4.5 billion from the United States since 1992, with $1.4 
billion applied specifically for security assistance and cooperation programs.126 
The difficulty is assessing whether or not these funds have provided for increased 
security and modernization efforts within Ukraine, to include logistics modernization 
efforts.  At the tactical level, assessments must consider basic logistics measurements of 
available supplies and warehousing.  While at the operational and strategic levels, 
verifications must be judged against whether doctrine and funding is aligning toward the 
president’s national security goals.  To be sure, there are some notable successes for 
Ukraine’s national desires and U.S. foreign policy goals such as the funding provided 
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under the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) and 
the Cooperation Threat Reduction (CTR) programs to reduce the nuclear threat and 
promote non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  While the decision to be a 
nuclear-free country rested solely within Ukraine’s political realm, the funding provided 
by the United States ensured the protection of the nuclear weapons until they were 
destroyed. 
B. COUNTRY BACKGROUND  
Ukraine spent most of the Twentieth Century as a Soviet Socialist Republic, that 
is, a constituent part of the Soviet Union, where Joseph Stalin had waged a campaign of 
mass murder in the 1930s and the Second World War exacted its toll in the following 
decade.  Although Ukraine has not always been defined by its relationship with Russia, 
the history of Ukraine and Russia are inextricably linked through centuries of shared and 
common experiences, sometimes as friends and other times as enemies.  The Soviet 
experience has left an indelible mark in Ukrainian “identity, politics, economics and even 
religion”127 and this experience looms large in Ukraine's post-independence efforts, such 
that they are, at modernization, westernization, and democratization.  However, it was not 
until the 1991 Ukrainian referendum declaring independence128 that Ukraine could be 
considered a full nation-state with declared boundaries.129 
The newly independent state of Ukraine was suddenly thrust into a vacuum, 
lacking non-Soviet experienced leadership, both in the political and the military realms.  
This situation was not unique to Ukraine as the transition away from Soviet-style political 
leadership, centralized economics, and military command structures affected all former 
Soviet republics.  A result of this transition was an immediate decline in access to 
education centers since the “highly centralized nature of the Soviet Union assured that the 
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best universities, research centers and think tanks were located disproportionately in 
Moscow, St. Petersburg, Novosibirsk and a few other Russian cities.”130  Despite these 
intellectual centers outside of Ukraine, the early prospects, forecasted by the International 
Centre for Policy Studies in Kyiv, for Ukraine’s transition were considered to be 
excellent as “Ukrainians were eagerly looking for the Western experience.”131  Although 
it was expected that a newly independent and nuclear-armed Ukraine would receive aid 
and assistance from Western nations, primarily to ensure nuclear weapon stability, the 
ensuing economic depression, lasting for nearly nine years,132 stalled Ukraine’s progress 
toward a modern liberal democracy. 
In an effort to ease the post-Soviet dissolution, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus 
established the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)133 in 1991 which provided 
for a loose connection as described by Ukraine’s then-president, Leonid Kravchuk, where 
each of the “former republics were now independent states and the ‘commonwealth’ 
would have no separate status other than that voluntarily delegated to it by the 
participants.”134  Boris Yeltsin’s failed attempt to maintain a degree of cooperation 
among the former Soviet republics brought the realization that the newly independent 
states would not necessarily go along with the Russian sphere of influence without 
Ukraine’s acquiescence.135  Although the CIS touted itself as a means to provide for 
closer relations among the former Soviet States, especially within the economic sphere, 
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the draw for Western aid increased as the failing economic transformation continued to 
reduce income levels to far below the poverty line as GDP declined by 60 percent within 
a few years.136 
The military legacy of the past emerged as a major problem of policy.  The 
declining currency valuation made it quite difficult for the newly created AFU to pay 
uniformed personnel and maintain equipment.  The Soviet dissolution had left the 
following oversupply of military units, personnel, and equipment in Ukraine at the end of 
1991: a “rocket army, three combined arms forces, two armored armies, one army corps, 
four Air Force armies, separate Air Defense army, the Black See [sic] Fleet.  The 
concentration of forces numbered about 780,000 personnel, 6,500 tanks, about 7,000 
combat armored vehicles, 1,500 combat aircrafts, more than 350 ships, 1,272 strategic 
nuclear warheads of intercontinental ballistic missiles and about 2,500 nuclear 
weapon[s].”137  This far too large cadre of personnel and armaments quickly became 
unsustainable with, then, current funding.  As a result, military personnel were not paid 
regularly and maintenance and repairs to armaments were severely inhibited which only 
compounded the ability for Ukrainian forces to maintain high readiness rates. Low 
readiness was also a result of the Soviet legacy for logistics support from the rear services 
and it became even more pronounced as there was no longer a central command authority 
to coordinate support.  Compounding these direct military issues was the lack of a 
Defense Ministry138 or a general staff who could advocate for increased spending.139  By 
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1993, the military budget only amounted to, and equivalent of, $399 million (in 2009 
constant U.S. dollars) or a meager 0.5 percent of GDP.140 
The declining economic situation coupled with a high number of nuclear weapons 
within an unstable country gave rise for immediate NATO and U.S. attention.  As a 
result, the U.S. provided Ukraine an initial aid package of $23.7 million in FY92 under 
the FREEDOM Support Act (FSA)141 along with other aid initiatives totaling nearly 
$118 million.142  These initial efforts, and subsequent annual aid disbursements, were 
orchestrated to stabilize the Ukrainian government and economy to thwart any potential 
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compromises to the nuclear caches along with filling the resources gap to circumvent 
other, potentially unfriendly, countries from gaining influence.  
C. ENTERING INTO NATO’S SPHERE 
Ukraine became the first CIS country to sign the PfP framework document on 8 
February 1994.  Acceptance to the PfP program created many training and reform 
opportunities for Ukraine’s military forces.  Membership to PfP signified the Ukrainian 
government’s desire to move away from Russia and specifically Russia’s sphere of 
influence.  Along with the PfP membership, came additional bilateral aid and assistance 
from the United States, initially amounted to more than $177 million in FY93 (with 
nearly $60 million specifically allocated for FSA and DoD security assistance),143 or 
about 0.3 percent of Ukraine’s GDP.144  This support was significant to Ukraine as it 
represented a fifteen percent increase for Ukraine’s defense structure. 
The DIB framework that becomes especially central for member countries’ 
defense reforms.  As indicated previously, Ukraine had only established its MoD in July 
1992.  Learning how to form, build, and staff a new ministry along with all of the 
ancillary departments became a monumental undertaking that stands at the center of this 
inquiry and which demands its tribute in theoretical and practical terms.  To be sure, a 
full discussion of the inherent complexities of a complete defense sector reform would be 
quite lengthy and beyond the scope of this thesis.  Instead, this section focuses 
specifically on defense logistics reforms as a feature of the effectiveness and durability of 
DIB and the totality of modernization efforts in Ukraine. It tackles the category of 
logistics reform in three broad areas: doctrine/policy, logistics planning, and 
procurements and budgets. 
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D. LOGISTICS MODERNIZATION FRAMEWORK 
 In Ukraine, the efforts of modernization for the logistics network are severely 
curtailed by the lack of published policy and specific guidance from the president.  While 
it appears that operational and tactical-level logistics professionals are making efforts to 
modernize and gain efficiencies through reorganizations, they too are confined to making 
changes based on available funding.  Still, the MoD has consistently not received their 
full budget requests from 2006–2010,145 begging the question of whether the Ukraine 
MoD has been able to satisfy the National Security Goals with what they have received.  
If the answer is yes, then the lack of full funding dictated by the Ukrainian Legislature 
would indicate that the MoD has not suitably allocated funds-to-requirements.  If the 
answer is no, then a specific assessment should indicate security shortfalls and MoD 
officials should be able to illustrate the funding shortfall-to-mission risks. 
However, given that the Ukrainian defense budget has been consistently 
underfunded in real terms,146 according to their definition of requirements, and with the 
priority of training and outfitting funds obligated for the Joint Rapid reaction Force 
(JRRF),147 which only received less than 25 percent of required funding in 2010,148 the 
probability of a significant amount of funds being provided for logistics modernization is 
low. 
1. Doctrine / Policy Modernization Efforts 
Since 1991, the Ukrainian defense organization has transformed itself from a 
Soviet-style military structure to an integrated military complex under a cabinet-level 
MoD.149  According to its founding statutes, the MoD is primarily responsible for 
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establishing policies and providing clear guidance on future actions based on the 
president’s national security strategy and has a General Staff to carry out that guidance.  
Since 2005, the Ukrainian president has provided an annual defense report, the White 
Book, in order to “regularly inform the public on activities of the Armed Forces of 
Ukraine as well as defence [sic] policy of the State and it’s [sic] challenges and 
solutions.”150  While this document provides a summary of the previous year’s events 
and outlines the goals for next year, it is primarily divided among the three services.  
Although the annual White Books are a product of the MoD’s national defense strategies, 
the first ever National Security Strategy, published in 2007, “failed to become the 
effective policy guidance for state institutions” as the policy guidelines were aimed for 
short-term goals and the requirement for strategic development was ignored.151  
However, president Yanukovyck’s most recent National Security Strategy (2010) 
indicated that “protection of Ukraine’s state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and 
inviolability of the state border,” was one of his five primary national security goals in 
addition to outlining security sector reform measures.152 
Among other gaps, the 2010 White Book does not address are specific goals for 
logistics reform beyond the note that “the Support Forces Command was re-organized to 
the Department of Logistics; the Department of Armament; and the Main Directorate of 
Operational Support to increase the flexibility and conformity of the logistics system 
according to the current stage of reforming the Armed Forces.”153  Though this step 
provides a structural reorganization, it does not correspond to a modernization of doctrine 
or the creation of a unified policy under the auspices of a national logistics concept that 
fully supports Ukrainian logistics interoperability with NATO and U.S. forces nor 
advances the needs of either. 
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The creation of such a doctrine or policy is central to the argument of 
modernization as it provides the upper echelon support, and ultimately funding, to 
transition from the Communist legacy of the Rear Services and all that it entails.  While a 
national logistics concept or doctrine does not necessarily have to mirror U.S. or even 
NATO logistics methods, it must provide the strategic guidance, in line with the national 
security requirements, for subordinate commanders’ modernization efforts.  Otherwise, 
reform measures may not produce the desired efficiencies of the AFU’s Rear Services at 
the tactical level but, more importantly they may prove detrimental to deployed 
operations.  Making these doctrinal changes will indeed become a costly endeavor 
(though it will be a much better use of funds than maintaining the status quo of waste) but 
it will be indicative of the Chief of the Logistics Department, the J-4, to ensure spares and 
warehousing are in not only in compliance with these changes but that the Chief has 
direct input to future doctrine reviews thereby ensuring modernization efforts are in 
compliance with the national logistics strategy. 
2. Logistics Planning Efforts 
Although logistics planning occurs at most levels, though in varying skill and 
scope throughout the command, the lack of a unified logistics doctrine along with 
legislative restrictions on stocking levels creates significant gaps within their armed 
forces support structure.154  Although the AFU Rear Services recognize that the 
application of the Soviet-style “push” logistics model does not adequately provide the 
operational planning flexibility required for peacetime or deployed operations, the 
implementation of a push/pull system, which is more responsive to warfighter’s 
immediate needs, has eluded the logistics command authorities as they continue to reform 
structurally vice operationally.  While they are making progress in their operational 
planning training, provided through WIF events, the Rear Services still support a 
centralized chain of command with some movement toward decentralization at the lowest 
echelons.  However, in the absence of explicit doctrine or policy directing close 
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coordination between the operational and tactical level planning, the possibility of 
creating large stockpiles of supplies in forward areas is greatly increased155 and thereby 
stifling unforeseen requirements on the battlefield, which will result in lower equipment 
readiness rates.  At this time, Ukraine’s combat forces, exclusive of NATO’s Response 
Force JRRF, are not trained for out-of-country deployments and it could be implied that 
the logistics support does not plan or train for these types of deployments either since 
those forces that do deploy currently rely on third-party logistics assistance.156  However, 
despite this shortfall, the government stated its commitment in 2008 to reforming their 
logistics planning processes in conformance with NATO doctrine by 2011.157  Although 
progress has been made in this area, the AFU Rear Services has indicated that strategic 
logistics planning is still not up to the fully flexible and integrated logistics system they 
have envisioned.158  As a result, the Chief of the Ukrainian Rear Services has outlined a 
five-year plan to continue logistics modernization efforts with an estimated completion in 
2017. 
3. Procurement and Budget Modernization Efforts 
Since 2006, the goal has been to consolidate the distribution and management of 
spares into three regional Joint Supply Centers, which task is purported also to include an 
electronic data interface to streamline asset tracking and accounting.159  However, due to 
funding shortfalls, this realization has not been brought online as of yet and the first 
testing of this network is scheduled for later in 2012.  Additionally, it is not clear if this 
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system will conform to NATO transaction procedures under Member Committee (MC) 
document MC 319/1 or if the procedures will be standardized under Standardization 
Agreement (STANAG) 2034 provisions in the near future.160  Considering that Ukraine 
has not entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) agreement with the NATO 
Maintenance and Supply Agency (NMSA) with regard to logistics support, it is unclear if 
these two systems will be compatible for interoperable deployments. 
The AFU procurement desires have also been severely curtailed by budgetary 
shortfalls.  Specifically for procurement and re-outfitting/re-servicing, Ukraine had 
reduced its outlays from 21.6 percent in 2006 and 16.3 percent in 2007 down to only  
7 percent for years 2009 and 2010.161  Coupled with a total funding shortfall of  
15.3 percent,162 the planned procurements of new materiel was grossly underrepresented 
as the bulk of the procurement funds went to the army for ten “Bulat” BM tanks163 and 
76 utility vehicles of various types.164  For 2011, the Ukrainian government is forecasting 
investments of about $94.5 million but budget shortfalls will only allow for less than half 
of the requirements165 to become funded.  Additionally, budget constraints have led to 
procurement delays of at least two years for the AN-70 and Mi-24 aircraft programs and 
a scaled back program of the Corvette-class stealth warship.166  Until such funding 
becomes available to modernize the force beyond the ground forces of the JRRF, service-
life extension programs will be initiated for aircraft, tanks, and a submarine.167  Further 
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exacerbating Ukraine’s budget concerns is that after a meager increase in 2012 funding, a 
leveling-off period will begin with the 2012–2015 budget years.168  The funding 
shortfalls become particularly problematic for future reform efforts when, considering the 
Ukrainian GDP per capita is $7,200 (in 2011 dollars based on GDP Purchasing Power 
Parity)169 and the military expenditures per capita amounts to only $75,170 future military 
spending does not keep in line with inflation or current operational commitments unless 
reductions in staffing and armaments is reduced at a faster rate.  However, such 
manpower or armament reductions are matters of national goals and legislative policies. 
With severe cutbacks in procurements and additional funds being allocated for 
service-life extensions the draw of funds away from logistics is compounded.  A final 
indicator that the logistics network is severely degraded is the readiness of combat units’ 
major end items, specifically in the realm of aviation and maritime as these spares are the 
most expensive.  As funds decrease, spares are not purchased and operability rates 
decrease which ultimately results in less training and operator proficiency.  For 2010, 
Ukraine maintained operability rates of “most aircraft (24 percent),171 helicopters (36 
percent), ships and support vessels (7 percent),”172 which leads to the final conclusion 
that logistics modernization has not sufficiently occurred and based on future funding 
streams does not look likely in the near term.  
                                                 
168 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Russia and the CIS, “Ukraine Defence Budget Overview,” 
May 10, 2011, 
http://jmsa.janes.com.libproxy.nps.edu/JDIC/JMSA/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/binder/j
dpb/jdpb214.htm@current&pageSelected=&keyword=&backPath=http://jmsa.janes.com/JDIC/JMSA&Pro
d_Name=JDPB&activeNav=/JDIC/JMSA (accessed August 13, 2011).  
169 Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook: Ukraine,” March 21, 2012, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/up.html (accessed March 25, 2012). 
170 Data was calculated from the CIA World Factbook and the SIPRI index. 
171 This figure could quite possibility be even lower as recent scholarship indicated that one airfield in 
particular, the Belbek airfield, reported a “one-in-twenty” readiness rate.  James Greene, “A Trans-Atlantic 
View on Contemporary Ukrainian Security Issues,” (in National Security and Defence, No. 4), (Kyiv: 
Razumkov Centre, 2010), 32. 
172 Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, White Book 2010, 11. 
 64
E. ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSION 
1. Assessment 
Despite all of the Ukraine’s efforts over the past twenty years, the larger question 
remains of whether the $4.5 billion provided by the United States has furthered Ukraine’s 
U.S. foreign policy goals to include: good governance, economic reform, rule of law, 
security sector reform, and engaging Ukrainian society.173  While some of these policy 
goals have met the internal measurements of the DOS, others have fallen short, based on 
a generic rating system of: above target, on target, improved but not yet met, and below 
target.  Meeting success goals is something a misnomer because the DOS does not equate 
U.S. foreign policy goals to aid provided where some areas such as GDP measurement 
are merely reporting rather than influencing.  On the Defense side, EUCOM measures 
success based on event completions of exercises, conferences, training, etc. such as Sea 
Breeze, Combined Endeavor, and mil-to-mil interactions. 
To illustrate how the assessment pyramid could work in practice in the case of 
Ukraine, consider the security sector reform policy goals outlined in the U.S.-Ukraine 
Charter on Strategic Partnership, which has been approved and signed by both the United 
States and Ukraine; this document clearly indicated that this effort is a joint policy goal.  
The charter indicates that one aim is to “gain agreement on a structured plan to increase 
interoperability and coordination between NATO and Ukraine” through enhanced 
training and equipment for Ukrainian armed forces, among other things174  The charter 
reflects the pinnacle of the pyramid under the presidential goals. 
The Ukrainian president outlines his national policy directives for NATO 
interoperability—in this case within his annual national security strategy.  These policy 
goals will be directed toward his MoD to incorporate logistics interoperability through 
the MoD’s annual White Book, representing the next lower tier on the pyramid.  The next 
step is the MoD’s inclusion of logistics interoperability within the PfP PARP goals and 
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ANP.  Alternatively, the U.S. embassy will ensure that security sector reform is included 
in the ambassador’s mission goals with a corresponding sub-goal of NATO 
interoperability.  The embassy staff will work with the ODC to ensure that close 
cooperation and dialogue occurs between the ODC and the MoD so that COCOM goals 
that support the security sector reform, and ultimately logistics interoperability, are in line 
with U.S. foreign policy goals.  It is at this point that the ambassador can verify the 
Ukrainian’s commitment for security sector reform by examining the Ukraine national 
security strategy and the MoD’s White Book to determine if these policy goals are 
included.  Further, the ODC can verify commitment through the MoD based on the 
initiated goals through the PARP ANP.  In this case, here is where the dividing line 
occurs that separates between evaluations at the tactical level and the verifications at the 
strategic level. 
Once the MoD and the ODC come to an agreement as to what is required for 
NATO logistics interoperability, which in Ukraine’s case also requires significant 
logistics modernization efforts, a plan will be established at EUCOM that will address 
Ukraine’s goals.  The EUCOM plan will consider what is needed and how much funding 
the COCOM can provide to incorporate Ukraine’s military within the logistics 
interoperability goal and ultimately participate in EUCOM’s annual Capable Logistician 
Exercise.  Also, EUCOM will charge one or more of the sub-component commands to 
take the lead for detailed assistance on specific tasks that support the higher goal of 
NATO logistics interoperability, such as warehousing techniques provided by the U.S. 
Army.  What may be required as well is formal logistics training that can be supported by 
the embassy through the IMET program.  It is here at the COCOM and below level that 
detailed evaluative assessments can be applied and rated based on successful completion 
of training events and/or tasks performed by the Ukrainian Rear Services. 
After the top-down requirements are completed, the bottom-up assessments flow 
to higher command authorities to determine if funds expended have met the foreign 
policy goals.  In this case, Ukraine does require some logistics modernization prior to 
becoming fully interoperable with NATO forces.  While Ukraine’s current warehousing 
policy is reminiscent of a Soviet-push logistics system, a multi-tiered approach must be 
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considered.  Not only will Ukrainian military members need to be trained on a pull-
logistics system, provided via IMET, but new computer systems and software suits must 
be acquired to handle this change, FMF or FMS requirements, plus the logistics 
technicians need to be trained on the system as well, IMET or FMF.  While this initial 
package comes from DOS, it is managed through the DoD and particularly through 
EUCOM’s advocate, in this case the U.S. Army Europe command was tasked.  
Additionally, the Army can provide bilateral assistance and consultation along with mil-
to-mil interoperability exercises to assess progress. 
Bringing this all together, if the DOS provided the Ukrainian Rear Services funds 
for new computer systems and training through the FMF and IMET programs and U.S. 
Army Europe was allocated funds to conduct a mil-to-mil logistics exercise, then the 
completion of the training, installation of the computer network, and the subsequent 
successful bilateral logistics exercise would provide positive evaluations for the funds 
spent.  The COCOM would assess that their funds and planning satisfied, or not, 
Ukraine’s initial logistics interoperability goal and indicate any remaining shortfalls or 
issues related to Ukrainian logistics progress.  At this point, the ODC and embassy staff 
must verify that the evaluation of EUCOM is still meeting the U.S. foreign policy goals 
and consider probably causes for any remaining shortfalls of Ukraine’s logistics 
interoperability desires. 
By examining Ukraine’s current national and MoD policies, the ambassador can 
verify if the proper emphasis has been directed from the national leadership.  Specifically 
for Ukraine, the national policies are void of specific logistics reform measures which 
have hampered tactical modernization efforts.  So, while the tactical efforts from the 
COCOM and below have produced positive results, based on the limited outcomes 
available, the U.S. foreign policy goal of security sector reform (within the realm of 
logistics) could be considered improved but not yet met target.  When this aspect is 
considered within the context of other security sector reform efforts, the U.S. ambassador 
to Ukraine can tell Congress that the funds have been well spent but additional work is 




When considering Ukraine’s logistics modernization efforts, there are no direct 
links between U.S. funding and Ukrainian logistics within the realm of the three areas of 
the logistics modernization framework.  Additional resources, such as independent 
evaluations and/or PARP assessments, must be examined by the country team to 
determine if logistics modernization progress has occurred.  Strictly examining DoD 
COCOM after-action reports or the annual DOS embassy mission reports will not provide 
the level of detail to make a direct correlation.  However, the use of these resources, in 
conjunction with the assessment pyramid, will permit greater fidelity in determining if 
Ukrainian logistics modernization, as an extension of U.S. foreign policies, has occurred.  
In other words, a lone report from DOS, DoD, PARP, or from independent analysis will 
only provide a narrow examination of one particular reform area for Ukraine.  The intent 
of applying the assessment pyramid is to bring these resources together to determination 
how well the $1.4 billion provided in security assistance and cooperation programs to 
Ukraine furthers U.S. desired outcomes. 
Bringing together these two forces under a single foreign aid framework such as 
the assessment pyramid will facilitate more meaningful assessments and verifications of 
U.S. efforts while linking them to U.S. foreign policy goals.  However, despite the 
current assessment methods within both the DOS and DoD in addition to the convolution 
of funding between Title 10 and Title 22 programs, the reality is that the U.S. aid and 
assistance provided to Ukraine filled a post-communist needs gap within that country.  
By filling that gap, the United States bought time, influence, and security, which has 
brought Ukraine closer to the United States and Westernized modernization. 
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IV. GEORGIA 
Georgia is strategically positioned at the base of the Russian Caucasus isthmus; 
bridging the Eurasian land mass with the Middle East and bordered by the Black Sea, 
Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.  While Georgia has been a major oil transportation 
route between Azerbaijan and the Black Sea since the late 1800s, their geostrategic 
position of importance as energy conduit for Caspian and Central Asian oil and natural 
has only increased in the intervening years.  However, despite Georgia’s difficult 
transition from communism to democracy, the Mikheil Saakashvili administration has 
made tremendous strides in moving toward Western powers since the 2003 Rose 
Revolution. 
Although Georgia has suffered economically and militarily from the civil war that 
afflicted it in 1991 as well as the 2008 Russian punitive incursion, the country still 
pursues ambitious political and economic reforms oriented to the West, though Georgia 
still lacks full democratic reforms.175  However, the United States strongly supports 
continued democratic reforms, and may realize these efforts in 2013 with the country’s 
first ever change of power through the process of free and fair political elections, and 
partnership building through the United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership.  
Additionally, the United States, as Georgia’s biggest bilateral donor, has greatly 
influenced Georgia’s reform efforts and has helped to stabilize that country economically 
through the challenging times of 2008, as well as investing heavily into Georgia’s 
military reform efforts to include the GTEP—a key U.S. foreign policy program for 
supporting the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in 
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Afghanistan that Georgia has supported with multiple deployments of troops (in excess of 
2,000).176 In contrast, similar Ukrainian deployments account for only 22 military 
members.177 
A. GEORGIAN FOREIGN ASSISTANCE  
Since Georgia’s westward move toward the NATO allies, the United States has 
been the largest aid and assistance contributor for Georgia’s political, economic, and 
military transformations, along with providing much needed agriculture and humanitarian 
assistance such as the Food for Progress program, which provided $34.2 million to 
Georgia in 1994.178  Following the Russo-Georgia war of 2008, the United States 
fulfilled its pledge in June 2009 of providing $1 billion to assist with internally displaced 
persons (already a problem after the 1991 war), rebuilding infrastructure, and helping to 
restore investor confidence in the Georgian economy179 with none of it being utilized for 
the Georgian MoD.180 
The nearly $4 billion provided to Georgia since 1992—with $1.8 billion allocated 
specifically to military and security assistance—has made a significant contribution to 
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Georgia’s ability to embrace democratic and economic reforms.181  While military 
assistance funds and PfP membership have positively aided the Georgia Armed Forces’ 
(GAF) (an entity that did not exist prior to 1991) ability to recruit, train, and deploy 
military units, specifically in support of ISAF missions, an assessment of whether the 
logistics modernization efforts within the MoD are providing the desired outcome must 
be determined. 
The security assistance and cooperation programs on which this chapter 
focuses182 each have specific desired outcomes based on broad U.S. foreign policy goals 
of democratization, westernization, security sector reform, and modernization.  Georgia 
received more than $500 million for the IMET, FMF, Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and 
Central Asia (AEECA), and the WIF programs over the course of seven years, though 
none of these funds were designated for logistics programs.  Still, positive results can be 
readily gleaned in the logistics realm, specifically within the IMET program.  Moreover, 
while the IMET program provides for military and civilian training, primarily to 
introduce foreign students to U.S. concepts and thinking, with the added benefit of the 
actual training, Georgia has shown that specific graduate-level schooling is beneficial for 
professional advancement.  This IMET success story can illustrated by the Georgian 
MoD’s appointment of Andro Barnovi, a former IMET recipient and Naval Postgraduate 
School student, as the Deputy Defence Minister for Training and Military Education  as 
well as Human Resources Policy of the Defence Ministry of Georgia.183 
B. COUNTRY BACKGROUND 
The formal Georgian-Russian bond began with Tsar Alexander I’s declaration 
that the East Georgian kingdom of Kartlo-Kakheti would be irrevocably joined to the 
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Russian empire on 12 September 1801.184  This annexation of Georgia to Russia was 
welcomed by the Georgian ruler, Georgii XII, as an effort to bulwark against Muslim 
incursions into the region.185  Although Georgia and the other South Caucasus countries 
remained under Russian and Soviet domination for almost two centuries, except for a 
three-year period between the revolution from Tsarist Russia to the Soviet Union from 
1918 to 1921.186  The Russian and Soviet influences, along with previous Persian and 
Ottoman cultures, have resulted in a diverse cultural region as the crossroads between the 
Black and Caspian Seas and North-South trade routes over the centuries.187 
It was not until the dissolution of the Soviet Union that Georgia was finally able 
to break the bonds of outside rule and established itself as an independent state in 1991.  
Although the newly independent nation was offered membership into the CIS, Georgia 
refused the offer and was penalized the former Soviet military hardware left within its 
borders.188  As the Russian military forces pulled back into Russia (with enclaves that 
remained in Georgia into the 1990s), the remaining Georgian paramilitary and police 
forces became disjointed and severely lacked basic military equipment such as rifles, 
aircraft, and naval vessels.  Similarly to other newly independent countries, Georgia was 
immediately thrust into civil unrest in 1991 as secessionists fought unsuccessful 
campaigns in Abkhazia and South Ossetia189 against the Georgian National Guard and 
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independent militias.190  The result led to the overthrow of the sitting president, Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia, and the invitation to the former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard 
Shevardnadze191 to come to Georgia as the head of the State Council was accepted.192  
He was later elected the speaker of the legislature in late 1992 and then the president 
under a new constitution in 1995.193 
The Shevardnadze reforms began in earnest as Georgia then reversed its previous 
decision to refuse CIS admission, and formally entered into the CIS in December 1993 
under direct pressure from the Russian government.194  Additionally, Georgia was 
anxious to move toward Western military protectionism as the Georgian Foreign 
Minister, Alexander Chikvaidze, signed the formal Partnership for Peace Framework 
Document only four months later on 23 March 1994.195  The much needed military 
reformation under Shevardnadze began in earnest in 1993 as the uniformed services 
started to become unified with Moscow’s 1994 agreement to provide “the professional re-
establishment and training of the Georgian Armed Forces,”196 in addition to “Russian 
military bases on Georgian territory and Russian Border Guards to patrol Georgia’s 
borders with Turkey.”197  By 1995, the militias were disbanded and in 1998 the Georgian 
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National Guard was subordinated to the Ministry of Defence.198  Although the United 
States began providing assistance to Georgia in 1992, similar to the initial support 
provided to Ukraine, under the FSA, it came primarily under democratization auspices 
with food programs and other USAID initiatives.  However, the close relationship and 
military support from Russia for the Georgian armed forces kept U.S. military assistance 
very minimal for nearly the next ten years, with the bulk of U.S. DoD military assistance 
allocated under the CTR Program.199 
While much of the earlier rhetoric about the benefits of CIS membership 
interested political leaders, the reality of Russia’s economic integration revolved more 
around geopolitical and military-political choices rather than based on sound economic 
rationale.200  As a result, the deep economic integration, so desired by Georgians, was not 
realized as the primary economic transformation was for Russia’s benefit at the expense 
of the CIS States.201  As Georgia’s GDP per capita fell 80 percent—from $4,762 to 
$953—between 1990 and 1994, coupled with sky-rocketing inflation that reached its 
peak of 7,400 percent in 1994, Georgia’s economic outlook was bleak.202  The 
combination of a weakening economy, still unresolved conflicts in the separatist  regions, 
and the growing Russian military influences on Georgian territory continued to warrant 
U.S. aid and assistance to the Georgian government.  As a result, USAID and the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture programs provided nearly $500 million in humanitarian and 
food assistance between FY92 and FY00 in an effort to stabilize the country. 
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C. ENTERING INTO NATO’S SPHERE 
Although Georgia signed the PfP Framework Document in 1994, immediate U.S. 
aid and assistance did not flow into the country as rapidly as it did in Ukraine since 
Georgia did not pose an immediate threat, i.e. the lack of nuclear weapons within the 
country, to U.S. interests.  Although the pro-Western Shevardnadze supported NATO 
integration through PfP, the staggering economic collapse of Georgia along with the 
Russian presence made reforms slow, although not non-existent.  While the Georgian 
Armed Forces initially participated in a few exercises under the framework of PfP, the 
divergent nature between NATO’s PfP and Russia’s CIS military oversight brought the 
nation’s security issues to a significant decision point.  Georgia had to decide to adhere to 
the values of the PfP or the CIS. 
In 1997, Shevardnadze made the commitment for Western security preferences as 
Georgia entered into the newly expanded (enhanced) PfP,203 which included the 
additional adoption of “peace support operations” in addition to joining the newly created 
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). 204  The expanded PfP elements provided a 
much needed basis, beyond that of the PfP Framework Document, which enabled 
Georgia to obtain greater involvement with NATO political and military bodies along 
with “political guidance and oversight.”205  Georgia’s active commitment for tighter 
bonds with NATO, despite having Russian forces still based in Georgia, also 
corresponded to larger aid packages from the United States beginning in FY98. 
In addition to continued food aid, the United States immediately provided $6.5 
million in FMS and FMF materiel and training opportunities to Georgia with steady 
annual increases thereafter.206  Correspondingly, aid and assistance increased two-fold, 
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from $54 million in FY97 to $221 million in FY98, with $98 million specifically 
allocated for FSA and DoD Security Assistance.207  It quickly became apparent to the 
Georgian government that accepting Western reforms led to increased aid, which allowed 
for a decrease in domestic military spending for the next five years.208  More importantly, 
these reforms allowed for greater interaction with NATO and its allies.  As Georgia 
continued actively to engage in economic and military reforms, the government formally 
established their PfP PARP goals in 1999.  Georgia’s PARP is aimed at increasing 
interoperability with NATO Allies and other PfP countries and receives, within the PARP 
framework, annual assessments of the partnership goals.209 
While the United States fully recognized Georgia’s unique situation of still having 
Russian military forces based in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and existing under the 
Russian sphere of influence, the U.S. supported Russia’s partial military withdrawal 
under the 1999 OSCE Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and Georgia.210  To 
assist with the planned withdrawal, the United States committed $10 million to facilitate 
the peaceful military transition.211 
Over the next five years, Georgia continued to reconstruct its military forces and 
participated in several NATO/PfP exercises while focusing on economic growth and 
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political reforms.212  However, the remnants of Soviet-style “corruption, incompetence, 
and criminalization” remained rampant throughout the Georgian government and resulted 
in the deposing of Shevardnadze during the Rose Revolution in late 2003.213  The pro-
NATO and pro-U.S. opposition leader, Mikheil Saakashvili, “marketed Georgia as a 
‘beacon of democracy’ in the post-Soviet space.”214  Saakashvili was anxious to increase 
NATO relations, to the point of actively seeking full NATO membership and provided 
300 peacekeeping forces to the coalition forces in Iraq in 2004 who were trained under 
the U.S. funded, $64 million, GTEP.215  By October of 2004, Georgia became the first 
country to agree to an IPAP in a specific effort toward NATO membership.216 
However, in August 2008, increasing tensions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
fueled by support from Moscow, led to military hostilities between Russian and Georgian 
forces.  While the details of the conflict are important for defining Georgian-Russian 
boundaries and the resistance of secessionist desires, the results are significant for 
Georgian-NATO relations.  During the war, the Russians destroyed significant quantities 
of Georgian military hardware and infrastructure.  Immediately following the ceasefire, 
Georgia broke off diplomatic relations with Russia and withdrew from the CIS.217  The 
United States made a significant pledge for security and stabilization assistance under the 
Section 1207 funds and allocated $100 million (over the next two fiscal years) to aid in 
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war infrastructure reconstruction.218  Additionally during 2008, Georgia replaced the 
IPAP with the ANP, which “reflected IPAP commitments as well as the new 
activities.”219  In 2010, Georgia furthered its relationship with NATO with the 
implementation of the NATO-Georgia Commission, which assists with developing 
deeper political reforms.220 
However, Georgia’s Defense Institution Building framework of constructing a 
NATO-stylized defense organization in accordance PfP, EAPC, PARP, IPAP, and ANP 
guidelines has been a tremendous task.  While Georgia forces have successfully been 
trained by the United States Marine Corps under the GTEP and deployed for ISAF 
missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the underlying factor that Georgian troops are not able 
to deploy at the strategic-level outside of their country without international assistance 
indicates an awareness of logistics limitations.221 
D. LOGISTICS MODERNIZATION FRAMEWORK 
Georgia’s logistics modernization efforts appear to be solid and on the right track 
for future improvements.  The logistics community’s biggest supporters for 
modernization are the President and the Minister of Defense, who have propagated clear 
doctrine and policies for logistics as well as DIB.  The commitment for a deployable 
capability, in line with NATO integration,222 will still require some work although it 
should not impede their overall logistics doctrine, despite the lack of strategic airlift.  
Georgia has the ability, as a PfP country, to enlist the assistance of the NMSA for NATO 
deployed logistics integration through an MOU which would be highly encouraged as the 
Logistics Directorate continues down this path.  The military drawdown and temporary 
increase in budgets indicates the MoD’s desire to place funds where they are most needed 
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by creating a more agile fighting force with new equipment and a logistics structure that 
will be ready to support the warfighter.  The desire is to improve “quality rather than 
quantity of the armed forces”223 and the GAF are well on their way. 
1. Doctrine/Policy Modernization Efforts 
 Immediately following Georgia’s independence in 1991, the country faced an 
immediate vacuum of military leadership at the Ministry of Defense level and suffered 
the loss of most of the Soviet air force and naval assets when these were pulled back to 
Russia.224  While devastating in the near term, this stark diminishment did provide 
Georgia the opportunity to reexamine its entire the national defense strategy and then 
form the defense structure according to its new needs.  However, this reform did not 
occur immediately; the country’s defense structure limped along for another decade until 
clear political stabilization took effect in 2003.  Since then, Georgia has aggressively 
pursued defense reorganization and modernization in line with the 2005 National Military 
Strategy and the 2005 Georgian Security Concept.  These documents laid the foundation 
for the 2007 Strategic Defense Review, which outlined an eight-year restructuring plan 
based around NATO MoD organizational structures.225  The SDR provided for clear 
guidance on logistics structures and reorganizations to best support the entire Georgian 
Armed Forces.226  The Minister of Defense has also published his 2010 “Minister’s 
Vision,” which reinforces the GAF guidance for logistics, modernization, acquisition, and 
doctrine improvements and continued modernization.227  The MoD has further provided 
more detailed logistics policy doctrine,228 which delineates specific responsibilities for 
acquisitions, distribution, sustainment, and handling and storage based on the NATO 
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Allied Joint Publication 4.0.229  The MoD has been aligned under NATO staff structures 
and has implemented a Staff Logistics Directorate as well as establishing a Logistics 
Support Command under the Chief of the Joint Staff.  Georgia has made great strides in 
structural command development which has provided a solid doctrinal basis for logistics 
modernization and reorganization efforts.  The logistics doctrine provides a key 
component for ensuring everyone in the chain of command understands what is expected 
of them in order to achieve the desired outcome of the transformation.  Based on these 
findings, the GAF appears to have the right direction and motivation to initiate changes. 
The GAF has a national supply system supported by sixteen main depots.230  
While there is a joint initiative between the MoD and the Ministry of Internal Affairs to 
review potential common logistics support for the Air Force and the Navy with an 
implementation goal of 2009,231 it is unclear if these efforts were enacted.  Considering 
that the Navy is being realigned under the MOIA and the Air Force fixed-wing assets are 
due to be permanently eliminated by 2015 with the rotary-wing assets falling under the 
Army,232 the prospect of spending funds for realignment may not be worth the benefit.  
However, bearing in mind that the GAF has sixteen depots in a country that is a little 
smaller than the state of South Carolina, the MoD should seriously consider a complete 
warehousing review to look for efficiencies which could reduce the number of depots 
along with stocking levels, ultimately saving money for redundant spares and personnel.  
The application of an economy-of-scale methodology could also be coupled with the 
collocation of supply depots and maintenance and repair facilities along with fully 
converting their current push logistics system233 with a more flexible push/pull system.   
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The current literature does indicate that such an initiative is in the works but given that 
the GAF is scheduled to downsize by nearly fifty percent by 2015,234 prudence may 
dictate this action sooner rather than later. 
2. Logistics Planning Efforts 
 Logistics planning occurs at all levels of command and is supported by the Joint 
Staff Logistics Directorate with short-term, long-term, and projected plans for future 
funding and initiatives.235  The lack of heavy/strategic airlift requires that out-of-area 
operations necessitate the planning cycle to address the use of third party support for the 
initial movements and for follow-on support needs.236  This policy is a vetted political 
determination that limits, though not necessarily in a negative way but by providing focus 
for modernization efforts.  While this shortfall does not preclude out-of-area operations, 
as displayed with current and past deployments in Afghanistan, the cost for movement 
and support is much higher using third-party logistics and should be considered during 
the planning process.  Engaging in joint-basing sustainment can mitigate some logistics 
and transportation costs by purchasing food, medical, and other non-technical supplies 
through a host basing agreement, which should be included with the NATO Operational 
Planning Process for logistics.237  Overall, the logistics planning cycle appears to be on 
track with NATO standards. 
3. Procurement and Budget Modernization Efforts 
 Given that the Georgian government was severely lacking in equipment and 
structure upon independence, the MoD was forced into making large investments in the 
purchase of small arms weapons for the infantry forces.  Once Georgia was politically 
stable, the GAF received much support from the United States and NATO allies in the 
form of Foreign Military Financing and low to no-cost provisions of military equipment 
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to include: ten UH-1H utility helicopters supplied by the United States and a “significant 
number” of maritime patrol vehicles provided several allied nations.238  However, it 
appears that these donated assets were not provided with sufficient spares packages, 
which accounted for the age of the platforms and increased maintenance costs to keep 
them operational.  The Georgian Air Force has resulted to cannibalizing two of the 
helicopters for spare parts and the Georgian Navy began retiring surplus or unseaworthy 
vessels to reduce operating and maintenance costs.239  While this stop-gap measure to 
provide military end items to the GAF may have propped up the number of pieces of 
equipment, the actual utility of these items lays in question given the expenses for 
upkeep.  The MoD has increased spending dramatically since 2003 and is expecting to 
continue budgeting higher than the NATO standard of 2.3 percent of GDP,240 although at 
a decreasing rate until meeting the standard in 2015.241  Since the budgets will be 
gradually decreasing, the MoD has planned acquisitions exceeding proposed Defense 
Budgets but these amounts will be offset by the drastic reduction in personnel expenses 
by reducing the authorized end strength allowances from 36,533 personnel to 18,755 
personnel by 2015.242  The MoD’s No. 1 priority of spending will be within the Defense 
Capabilities Development category which will focus on air defense acquisitions, heavy 
artillery, and attack helicopters243 but more importantly will invest significant funds in 
the infrastructure modernization program which includes logistics modernization.244  The 
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result of the additional procurement funds applied towards logistics modernization will 
continue to yield improvements providing modernization efforts are targeted at logistics 
infrastructure and in coordination with new weapon systems. 
E. ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSION 
1. Assessment 
However, bearing in mind Georgia’s desire for, and the offer of, full NATO 
membership, the question remains of how future funding should be applied, considering 
that Georgia still hosts Russian forces, namely: 147th motorized rifle division at 
Akhalkalaki, 145th motorized rifle division at Batumi, and peacekeeping forces in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.245  Therefore, if the United States has achieved greater 
interoperability and developed closer ties with Georgia, then the goals of future 
interaction with the GAF and the Georgian government at large must also be considered 
prior to allocating future funds.  It becomes clear that an evaluation of PARP goals and a 
verification of the U.S. foreign policy goals should be closely examined based on the 
assessment pyramid. 
 These considerations, as applied to the assessment pyramid, follow the same top-
down process as Ukraine.  A Georgian foreign policy goal, established by the 
ambassador, that can be used within the assessment pyramid framework could consider 
defense and security cooperation, specifically focusing in on NATO interoperability 
through “enhanced training and equipment for Georgian forces.”246  This policy goal, as 
outlined within the U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership, and signed by both the 
U.S. Secretary of State and the Georgia Minister of Foreign Affairs,247 provides the 
pinnacle of the assessment pyramid.  Correspondingly, the Georgian president outlined 
modernization goals that further interoperability desires and gave the commitment to 
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“provide military and political support to the coalitions led by the United States”248 in his 
national security concept.  This policy goal was directed to the MoD and was further 
expanded upon through the 2007 Georgian SDR, which indicated the GAF’s commitment 
to supporting NATO-led operations along with ensuring the proper balance of logistics 
support for those operations.249 
 These top two tiers of the pyramid support the ambassador’s goal of 
interoperability and coordination between NATO and Georgian forces and are verified 
through the national strategic documents.  The next tier down will start to bring policy 
into action as the ODC and the MoD begin to review and select specific PfP PARP goals 
which support the upper echeloned policy goals.  While the national policy goal is NATO 
interoperability, the MoD and ODC agreed upon course of action to support this goal is 
the creation of the GTEP. 
 The GTEP concept is then passed to EUCOM and is then subsequently tasked to 
Marine Forces Europe for implementation.  Here at the tactical level, the Marine Corps 
works in close concert with the embassy to outline numerous sub-tasks (METs and 
METLs) and requests funding to support the multi-year program.  Although the Marine 
Corps is responsible for the results of the program, the early progress is a function of the 
DOS as it must provide significant funding under the FMF and FMS to ensure adequate 
materiel and equipment is available for the actual tactical infantry battalion training.  This 
blending of responsibilities for funding and training is critical to understanding not only 
responsibility but providing coordinated actions in support of the upper echelon goals.  A 
key difference, at this point, between Ukraine and Georgia is that Ukraine’s logistics 
modernization became part of the deployment mantra while the Georgian logistics policy, 
as promulgated by the SDR, specifically indicates that strategic out-of-area air and sea 
deployments is not a capability set for Georgia and these types of deployments will 
require commercial or other nation support.250 
                                                 
248 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, “National Security Concept of Georgia,” accessed April 
28, 2012, http://www.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=12 
249 Ministry of Defence of Georgia, Strategic Defence Review: Final Report 2007, 64. 
250 Ministry of Defence of Georgia, Strategic Defence Review, 92. 
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 At this tactical level of assessment, reasonable and quantifiable bottom-up 
evaluations of progress and success are easily ascertained.  The Marine Corps can readily 
determine, through the GTEP training program the number of Georgian soldiers trained 
and the number of hours spent training the Georgian battalion.  At the same level, the 
DOS, through the embassy, can track the number of IMET students trained (where the 
bulk of IMET students attend English language training) and the quantity of uniforms, 
radios, etc. provided to the Georgian military under the FMF or FMS programs.  The 
tactical level evaluation determines if the goods and services provided, as allocated 
through their specific programs, have met the bilateral agreement for requested quantities 
of materiel and training evolutions. 
 The next level up the pyramid will determine if the equipment and training have 
met EUCOM’s goal of preparing a Georgian infantry battalion for deployment to 
Afghanistan in support of NATO’s ISAF mission.  Since Georgia has deployed several 
battalions, and the battalion examined in this case is ready to deploy, then the EUCOM 
evaluation would be considered positive and the funds expended would be reflected as 
well spent.  Providing that these deployments are also building the national logistics 
structure, within NATO interoperability standards, to support the pre-deployment training 
requirements, the Georgian national goal of logistics modernization, through the GTEP 
venue, is being achieved.  The logistics modernization progress would have to be verified 
by the ODC, through the ANP goals, because even supporting domestic training and 
exercises requires a robust and modern logistics network, despite the out-of-area logistics 
restrictions. 
 At the upper tiers of the pyramid, the ambassador must then verify if the Georgian 
president, and the MoD by extension, remains committed to NATO interoperability, to 
include logistics, through policy speeches and national security strategies but also by 
examining MoD funding to logistics and modernization endeavors in general.  As long as 
the governmental hierarchy continues to fund as current levels or more, then the efforts 
and money the United States provides to Georgia is worthwhile and can be considered a 
foreign policy success, at least within the security sector reform foreign policy goal.  The 
ambassador must then consider the input from EUCOM and the ODC, along with his 
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own internal verifications, to make the final assessment if Georgia has met or exceeded 
its target.  If so, then recommendations to DOS and Congress could entail funding 
requests at current levels or gradually reduced levels, in the best case scenario that the 
Georgian military has advanced far enough to assume a greater financial burden. 
2. Conclusion 
As remarkable as Georgia’s transition has been, especially since the Rose 
Revolution, considering the U.S. investment of $1.8 billion in security assistance and 
security cooperation, the improvements in military logistics appears to be modernizing 
toward NATO standards.251  Although there are no direct links between U.S. funding and 
Georgian logistics, within the realm of the areas of the logistics modernization 
framework, the broader context of U.S. assistance programs for DIB should be evaluated 
against Georgia’s PfP PARP goals and the U.S. Mission Strategic and Resource Plan to 
ensure funding is ultimately being applied toward U.S. foreign policy ends. 
The result of the $4 billion spent on Georgia’s democratization, Westernization, 
and modernization efforts along with security sector reform has provided suitable and 
sustainable tools to maintain themselves as a stable country that continues being a key 
energy resource conduit to Western Europe.252  While this is a reasonable and apparent 
success of funds well spent, can this same success be extrapolated out for all of the funds 
allocated for Georgia that furthers DOS foreign policy goals that includes: good 
governance and rule of law, regional cooperation, security sector reform, economic 
reform, and engaging the Georgian society.253  Under the current method of assessments, 
that determination, not necessarily specific to Georgia’s case, eludes policy makers which 
initiated the impetus for the Congressional quest for metrics.  Without a comprehensive 
                                                 
251 United States Department of State, “Foreign Operations Appropriated Assistance Fact Sheet, 
December 2009: Georgia.” 
United States Department of State, “Foreign Operations Assistance Fact Sheet, April 2011: Georgia.” 
252 United States Department of State, “Foreign Operations Appropriated Assistance Fact Sheet, 
December 2009: Georgia.” 
United States Department of State, “Foreign Operations Assistance Fact Sheet, April 2011: Georgia.” 
253 United States Department of State, “United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership.” 
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analytical tool, such as the assessment pyramid that bridges the DOS and DoD security 
assistance and security cooperation efforts, the answer will always be left to the 
subjectivity of government bureaucrats. 
Despite the challenges Georgia is facing with continued Russian occupation, 
which is directly impacting further advancements from NATO to extend full NATO 
membership, the stalwart commitment of Saakashvili to continue training and deploying 
Georgian infantry battalions in support of ISAF, despite a forecasted military down-
sizing of nearly fifty percent over the next three years coupled with decreasing military 
budgets, indicates a willing and strategic partner that has earned the support of the United 
States.  Continued security assistance and security cooperation efforts are essential to 
maintain the bilateral cooperation as well as providing accurate assessments and 
verifications of U.S. foreign policy goals to Congress under the assessment pyramid to 
ensure compliance and sustained financial support to Georgia. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in a new era for the world.  Many 
countries that were diametrically opposed on Christmas Day 1991 sought for a new 
understanding of the world and what had become of the Communist enemy by New 
Year’s Eve.  Shortly thereafter, the Soviet States gained independence and new 
governmental structures.  The withdrawal of the Soviet military from these new countries 
left varying degrees of equipment, experience, and culture behind.  Within three years, 
Ukraine and Georgia sought admission to the Partnership for Peace program, NATO’s 
response to broadening cooperation with former Warsaw Pact countries, and were both 
accepted in 1994.  Through the PfP process, Ukrainian and Georgian political leadership 
indicated the desire to overhaul and modernize their individual defense structures—from 
the Ministry of Defense and all the way down to the lowest soldier in the field. 
 However, in order to realize the extended benefits of a comprehensive military 
transformation for Ukraine and Georgia, they each require a sustainable and modernized 
logistics network that is interoperable with western NATO partners.  To meet the PfP 
goal of interoperability, Ukraine and Georgia would need to have formal 
acknowledgment of logistics requirements starting from the political leadership through 
policy enactments addressing the spectrum of logistics requirements from the 
procurement and budgeting cycles to a workable system for spares management and 
maintenance and repair facilities.  As it stands now, the foreign aid programs are too 
convoluted to provide precise allocations of funds for programs not specifically listed, 
such as logistics, which hinder the ability for these countries to modernize effectively for 
the long-term. 
The efforts of the United States and NATO have provided hundreds of millions of 
dollars of financial aid and assistance, donated or sold military equipment and hardware, 
and offered thousands of training opportunities to these countries in support of their 
national goals which have corresponded with U.S. national interests and ambassadorial 
foreign policy goals.  While both Ukraine and Georgia have engaged in drafting national 
security strategies and doctrines, outlining new planning methods, and initiating 
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procurement and modernization plans, the logistics network to support these changes has 
lagged.  Through this study, it becomes apparent that Georgia has robustly developed its 
logistics network in accordance with the MoD’s directives and vision for supporting their 
military.  Although there are still improvements that can be realized through logistics 
infrastructure realignments and the conversion to a push/pull system, the Georgian 
government’s willingness to modernize is promising for continued improvements.  
Conversely, Ukraine has made improvements in its logistics network but the 
modernization process has been stunted by unclear logistics doctrine and a shortage of 
funds specifically allocated for logistics. 
While it is understood that each country’s government will set its own national 
priorities and budget accordingly, what is not clear is why there is such a disparity 
between the militaries with regard to their logistics modernization efforts.  Although 
Ukraine and Georgia indicated challenges with regard to managing existing and future 
requirements with continually decreasing resources, the math of foreign aid doesn’t seem 
to reflect that perceived reality as much as it appears to be more of a misunderstanding of 
internal constraints under the myriad of foreign aid programs.  It would be a mistake to 
evaluate the amount of security assistance and security cooperation aid with successful 
logistics modernization efforts as it would appear that the larger investment of foreign aid 
(refer to Table 1) should directly correspond to significant progress in logistics 
modernization since Georgia received a greater amount of aid and assistance, more than 
$567 million, as compared to Ukraine’s aid and assistance programs totaling nearly $340 
million.  Under U.S. Federal Law, these funds have a specific purpose and must be used 
accordingly.  The problem that the logistics community has is that it does not generally 




Table 1.   Departments of State and Defense Security Assistance Program Authorization 
Amounts derived from DOS and DoD historical data.(From: 254) 
While the U.S. Code, under section 1206, provides a type of assistance that can 
allow for the purchase of some spare parts and tools,255 infrastructure improvements—
which can allow for new warehousing and logistics network purchases–are only allowed 
under section 1207 funding.256  The misalignment of requirements to funding streams 
creates a disjointed effort in building up the logistics network.  Under these restrictions, 
the 1206 funding for spares and tools, Georgia and Ukraine benefit; while under the 1207 
                                                 
254 The figures for AEECA, FMF, IMET, and NADR are only calculated under the DOS Peace and 
Security Category.  FMS is managed and reported under the DoD's DCSA.  FMS Total Sales Agreements 
are currently only available through the end of FY10. United States Depart of State, 
“Foreignassistance.org,” accessed March 10, 2012, http://foreignassistance.gov/DataView.aspx.  United 
States Department of Defense, “Defense Security Cooperation Agency: Historical Facts Books & Fiscal 
Year Series,” accessed April 25, 2012, http://www.dsca.mil/programs/biz-ops/factsbook/default.htm. 
255 United States Government Accountability Office, International Security, 57. 
256 United States Government Accountability Office, International Security, 59. 
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funding for infrastructure improvements, only Georgia benefits.  While this corollary that 
Georgia receives both funding streams, and has a clearly more successful logistics 
modernization program at work, is perhaps more apropos than strictly the quantity of 
funds received.  It would then reason that it is not the amount of funding provided, 
necessarily, but that funding is applied where it is needed. 
Moreover, Congress wants to know if the $3.2 billion ($1.4 billion for Ukraine 
and $1.8 billion for Georgia) was well spent and produced reasonable outcomes, the 
response is not so easy to give along with tangible results.  For instance, considering only 
Section 1206 programs from FY06–FY09, Georgia received $18 million for the 
Training/technical Assistance Program (along with five other programs).257  Should 
metrics be based on whether training and technical assistance was provided or whether 
the Georgians are now capable of providing their own training, such as train-the-trainer 
instruction, or how well the Georgians learned and retained the training given?  Answers 
to these questions are difficult and can vary depending on the more specific nuances of 
how the funds were utilized.258 
However, strictly looking at the dollars for outcome measurement, it would 
appear that Georgia should be the furthest along in their defense institution building and 
military modernization efforts while Ukraine would be lagging in comparison.  
Validating such comparisons requires a much more detailed examination of each of the 
countries’ defense structures and an objective review must be conducted considering all 
military aid initiatives along with how well they have progressed within their national 
military structure and governmental policies over the years. 
                                                 
257 The Section 1206 family of programs consists of 16 different programs to include: 
Training/technical assistance, Spare parts/tools, Communication equipment/radios, Radar/surveillance 
equipment, Boats, Computers/software, Ground vehicles, Body armor/individual equipment, Global 
positioning systems, Night vision devices, Facilities, Small arms/machine guns, Ammunition, 
Helicopters/aircraft, and Miscellaneous equipment.  United States Government Accountability Office, 
International Security, 57. 
258 During this time frame, Ukraine received $12 million for five programs (Training/technical 
assistance, Spare parts/tools, Communication equipment/radios, Computers/software, and Facilities) while 
Georgia received $17.9 million for six programs (Training/technical assistance, Spare parts/tools, 
Communication equipment/radios, Radar/surveillance equipment, Ground vehicles, and Miscellaneous 
equipment).  United States Government Accountability Office, International Security, 57-58. 
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The logistics modernization efforts for both Ukraine and Georgia reflect this 
situation; modernization, conversion from soviet-style logistics, and indoctrinating the 
military culture to Western/NATO standards is a slow and methodical process.  However, 
the level of funding and length of support is partially determined on the willingness and 
commitment of the local government to back a true logistics overhaul that spans from the 
warehouse to the acquisition cycle with dedicated and sustained budgets. 
Complete logistics reforms are critical in determining national priorities and 
should be weighed against political indicators to ascertain how U.S. foreign policy should 
be applied.  While Georgia has received more U.S. aid and assistance funding than 
Ukraine, Georgia’s commitment to building a lean and effective military, to include 
specifically addressing logistics, in addition to their stated goal of NATO accession and 
their commitment to providing forces in support of ISAF, provides the right blend of 
rhetoric and action.  This makes funding initiatives not only obvious but it also allows for 
better evaluations and verifications that funds are spent well. 
Conversely, in Ukraine, the national documents do not specifically outline 
comprehensive logistics overhauls nor has there been a firm commitment from 
policymakers to funds such reforms.  Although Ukraine has received significant amounts 
of aid and assistance from the United States, the president has eschewed NATO accession 
goals and wishes to remain in a non-aligned status.  While many of the Ukrainian Rear 
Services personnel indicate their willingness to work with NATO countries, through the 
PfP program, their national government has not fulfilled its requirements for reasonable 
and sustained funding for basic operations and maintenance of facilities and equipment.  
This situation becomes problematic as logistics modernization efforts receive even less 
priority than the infantry or aviation units.  Additionally, the lack of stated policy and 
doctrine makes modernization even more difficult if the J-4 does not have the guidance to 
know where they are going in order to properly request and budget for those changes.  
The result is that the lack of political commitment from Ukraine keeps U.S. aid and 
assistance at a reduced level when modernization efforts are much harder to evaluated 
and verify. 
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The United States Congress must re-evaluate these multiple funding streams and 
not align them so rigidly but allow the country teams and Combatant Commanders 
flexibility with their application.  Accepting these changes would represent a major shift 
in U.S. foreign policy as it would relegate Congress to the oversight of funds in a holistic 
manner, by total efforts per country, vice allowing for individual projects that may not be 
in the best interest of the Combatant Commander or U.S. foreign policy.  Additionally, 
methods of evaluation of progress needs to be created and applied within reasonable 
parameters which allow for greater flexibility as opposed to their current use which 
makes providing measurements of success untenable.259 
Further exacerbating the situation, U.S. foreign policy practices favor special 
individualized projects, which do not create the basis for collaboration among U.S. 
agencies and departments.  This is most prominent when examining Department of State 
Title 22 funds and Department of Defense Title 10 funds which many times can be used 
for the same endeavors.  The result is that U.S. embassies and Combatant Commanders 
task Comptrollers and legal representatives to decipher Congressional mandates to ensure 
funds are spent specifically, regardless if it is in concert with the host country’s desires.  
Additionally, many of these Title 10 fiscal mandates are directed inappropriately as they 
greatly increase the militarization of U.S. foreign policy.  Moreover, without a 
comprehensive realignment of how U.S. foreign aid is structured, applied, and measured 
for effectiveness, security assistance and security cooperation efforts will remain 
disaggregated and confusing for those responsible for the execution of these programs as 
well as those charged with reporting successful application of such funds. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Ideally, the basis in policy for modernization efforts should lay with the realm of 
economic development primarily, while military modernization efforts should be 
undertaken once a nation’s economy thrives.  Such a dictum goes against the imperative 
of security, especially for nations damned to a military vacuum.  The former Soviet states 
had no luxury as imagined in a think tank granted their history and geography.  Territorial 
                                                 
259 United States Government Accountability Office, International Security, 38. 
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security was needed much sooner than economic viability and as a stop-gap measure, the 
United States began investing billions of dollars into their economies through various aid 
and assistance programs.  While some in civil society might believe that the provided aid 
equates to increased democratization in these countries, policy makers and program 
executors should exercise care when spending the nation’s treasure.  The following 
recommendations provide one such avenue for monitoring the judicious use of funds. 
1.  The first aspect to consider is that a foreign aid organizational restructuring is 
desperately needed to meet the needs of the present and future.  Throughout this thesis, 
numerous instances have pointed out the overlapping of programs, funding, agencies, and 
foreign policy goals.  While there have been attempts over time to reduce redundancy and 
increase agency coordination, with some success, these efforts are misplaced since they 
do not address the fundamental problem of aid disorganization.  This must be solved at 
the Congressional level through a comprehensive review of U.S. foreign policy goals in 
order to simplify the foreign aid framework. 
It should be constructed so that every instance of foreign aid funding is applied to 
some greater foreign policy goal such as, the institution of the democratic rule of law, for 
example.  When aid is applied in this manner, the Congressional requirements for 
providing metrics for success become obviated under the higher policy goal.  Further, 
specific to DOS security assistance and DoD security cooperation programs, Congress 
must decide how foreign policy should be applied not only with respect to U.S. policy 
goals but how this support is viewed by the rest of the world. 
Tip O’Neill was correct in that all politics are local; however, not all opinions are.  
International public opinion matters, especially when the United States wants to engage 
in military actions abroad.  Therefore, how the United States provides aid, and how it is 
viewed by outsiders, matters, especially when that aid is perceived to be a militarization 
of foreign policy.  Because of this truism, the current DoD security cooperation funding 
needs to be reallocated under the DOS, as part of the total foreign aid restructuring.  
Future DoD involvement, especially for mil-to-mil exercises and interoperability, should 
not be curtailed as long as it funded under the DOS to further foreign policy goals. 
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2.  To support a revitalized aid structure, the need to evaluate if funding is indeed 
meeting U.S. foreign policy goals, the usage of the assessment pyramid will provide basic 
concept for how funds and programs should be evaluated and verified throughout the 
spectrum of tactical-level tasks, operational-level goals, and strategic objectives.  But 
more than just using this concept, is educating policy makers and program executors 
about it and how it can alleviate needless metric reporting as well as countless hours of 
metric creation in order to just report the metrics. 
To illustrate, a dollars-to-outcomes methodology is partially being created within 
the EUCOM J-5.  The J-5 has been working to establish METs and METLs for specific 
country goals (agreed to by the recipient country’s MoD and the U.S. country team, in 
conjunction with EUCOM and the ODC) as a type replicator of the DoD’s newly 
instituted Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS), which links resources to 
readiness metrics.  While this methodology provides only one aspect of the dollars to 
outcome requirement, it is however a significant factor in determining the overall success 
of defense reforms.  When it is used at the base level of the pyramid, it provides strong 
justifications for future funding requirements.  However, these metrics would need to 
remain local because in and of themselves, they do not represent success or failure of 
U.S. foreign policy goals.  They merely represent evaluations of what can be measured. 
3.  To culminate the previous two recommendations would be the simple 
assignment of responsibility for all foreign assistance initiatives.  Within any particular 
country, it is the ambassador who is wholly responsible for the promotion of U.S. foreign 
policy goals, less those whom the United States does not have diplomatic relations with.  
Since there is no one of higher authority, it would stand to reason that the ambassador 
should render full accountability to Congress, through the State Secretary, for all aid and 
assistance within that country.  Military aid and assistance should be no exception. 
Although efforts have been made to orchestrate security assistance and security 
cooperation initiatives through the implementation of the ODC, the ODC still works for 
the COCOM while the Defense Attaché works for the ambassador.  The added level of 
bureaucracy for the ODC would not be required if the policy was made such that the 
ambassador was held accountable for all events within their country.  It is the serving of 
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two masters (the COCOM and the ambassador by the ODC), which has been brought 
about by the militarization of foreign aid and policy so that COCOM initiatives satisfy 
the COCOM while embassy initiatives satisfy the ambassador.  It should be one policy, 
one effort, and one position of authority that holds the responsibility with broad 
coordinating powers—that person is the ambassador. 
4.  No matter what recommendations are acted upon or even considered, there is 
one aspect of the security assistance program that warrants much more emphasis and 
funding than is being currently given—the IMET program.  The FY10 allocation for the 
DOS IMET program was $108 million and supported 125 countries with 7,100 students 
educated and trained.260  The value of this program to the greater national interest and 
needs of foreign security and defense policy cannot be overstated enough with the 
opportunities it provides to foreign governments and their militaries.  Many of the IMET 
programs also require prior language training (about thirteen percent of program costs for 
the 453 IMET language students),261 which is also funded under IMET, and adds an 
additional level of interoperability once these trainees return to their home country. 
As this thesis has illustrated, the value IMET provides ranges from the tactical 
level to the strategic level as IMET recipients are placed into positions of authority within 
their government, which has not been the 100 percent of the time, but still with sufficient 
frequency to warrant the endurance of the program as a feature of the U.S. security 
cooperation.  The teaching of U.S. values, culture, and language enhances relationships 
between militaries and governments and is easily evaluated for its worth when compared 
against the assessment pyramid.  When compared to the overall budget, IMET is low-
impact fiscally (only 1.9 percent of the security assistance budget and a measly 0.2 
percent of the total DOS foreign aid budget)262 but, high impact for relationship building 
as a key factor for DIB, as the example of the Ukrainian major reflected. 
                                                 
260 United States Government Accountability Office, International Military Education and Training, 
5. 
261 United States Government Accountability Office, International Military Education and Training, 
10. 
262 United States Department of State, “International Affairs Function 150.” 
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Many times, success is measured in glacial movements that sometimes even 
recede slightly, rather than the rocket speed changes desired under U.S. Congressional 
timelines.  However, divergence or even stagnation from these countries, as they are 
making serious efforts to reform under Western/NATO-style changes, should be 
considered very carefully.  Any financial or perceived departures from current support 
levels will create a national security assistance vacuum, which will quickly be filled by 
other countries that might not share the same values or direction that will benefit the 
recipient country or even be compatible with U.S. foreign policy goals.  I advocate that 
the stated methodology and recommendations, in addition to the practical use of the 
assessment pyramid by the COCOMs and embassies, could be applied so that they will 
satisfy Congressional mandates of providing objective progression metrics while still 
allowing for the art of diplomatic and subjective DOS and DoD initiatives that rely on 





Figure 4.   Topology Chart of Professional Armed Forces from Forster, Edmunds, and 
Cottey. (From: 263) 
                                                 
263 Forster, Edmunds, and Cottey, The Challenge of Military Reform in Postcommunist Europe, 9. 
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